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1. INTRODUCTION
The amparo proceeding is an extraordinary judicial remedy spe-
cifically conceived for the protection of constitutional rights
against harms or threats inflicted by authorities or individuals. It
is a Latin American procedural means for constitutional litigation
that normally concludes with a judicial order or writ of protection
(amparo, protecci6n or tutela), that has been indistinctly called an
action, recourse or suit of amparo. 1
This constitutional litigation means was introduced in the
American continent during the nineteenth century, and although
similar remedies were established in the twentieth century in
some European countries, like Austria, Germany, Spain and Swit-
zerland, and also in Canada, it has been adopted by all Latin
American countries, except in Cuba, being considered as one of the
most distinguishable features of Latin American constitutional
law. 2 As such, it has influenced the introduction of a similar rem-
edy in the Philippines, the writ of amparo, which was created by
the Supreme Court in 2007. 3
This specific remedy, providing for the protection of fundamen-
tal rights, contrasts with the constitutional system of the United
States, where the effective protection of human rights is effective-
ly assured, following the British procedural law tradition, through
the general judicial actions and equitable remedies, particularly
the injunctions, which are also used to protect any other kind of
personal or property rights or interests.
The amparo proceeding was first introduced in Mexico in 1857
as the juicio de amparo, evolving in that country into a unique and
1. See HtCTOR FiX-ZAMUDIO AND EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR (COORD.), EL
DERECHO DE AMPARO EN EL MUNDO, Edit. Porra, M6xico, 2006; ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS,
EL AMPARO A LOS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES CONSTITUCIONALES. UNA APROXIMACI6N
COMPARATIVA, Cuadernos de la Cdtedra de Derecho Pdblico, n ° 1, Universidad Cat6lica del
Tdchira, San Crist6bal, 1993; also published in LA PROTECCI6N JURiDICA DEL CIUDADANO.
ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JEStS GONZALEZ PPREZ, Tomo 3, Editorial Civitas,
Madrid, 1993, pp. 2.695-2.740; and ALLAN R. BREWER-CARfAS, MECANISMOS NACIONALES
DE PROTECCI6N DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (GARANTiAS JUDICIALES DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS EN EL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COMPARADO LATINOAMERICANO), Instituto In-
teramericano de Derechos Humanos, San Jos6, 2005.
2. See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE AMPARO PROCEEDINGS (Cam-
bridge University Press 2009)., pp. 77ff.
3. See generally Allan R. Brewer-Carias, The Latin American Amparo Proceeding and
the Writ of Amparo in The Philippines, 1.1 CITY UNIV. HONG KONG L. REV. 73-90 (Oct.
2009).
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very complex institution exclusively found in Mexico. Not only
was it designed to guarantee judicial protection of constitutional
guarantees against the State acts or actions, but to perform mul-
tipurpose judicial roles, including actions and procedures that in
all other countries are separate processes, like judicial review,
cassation review and judicial review of administrative actions.
In the rest of Latin America the amparo gave rise to a very dif-
ferent specific judicial remedy established with the exclusive pur-
pose of protecting human rights and freedoms, becoming in many
cases, more protective than the original Mexican institution. The
institution has been described in various ways, always meaning
the same, such as: Amparo (Guatemala); Acci6n de amparo (Ar-
gentina, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Uruguay, Dominican Re-
public, Venezuela); Accidn de tutela (Colombia); Proceso de amparo
(El Salvador, Peru); Recurso de amparo (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nica-
ragua, Panama); Recurso de protecci6n (Chile) or Mandado de se-
guranga and mandado de injun~ao (Brazil).4 In all of the Latin
American countries, the provisions for the action are embodied in
the constitutions; and in all of them, except Chile, the actions of
amparo have been expressly regulated by statutes, particularly in
special statutes related to constitutional litigations, with the ex-
ception of Panama and Paraguay where the amparo action is regu-
lated in the general procedural codes (C6digo Judicial, C6digo
Procesal Civil).
II. THE RIGHT TO AMPARO IN VENEZUELA
Within a mixed system of judicial review, since 1961, the Vene-
zuelan Constitution establishes a "constitutional right for amparo"
or to be protected by the courts, 5 that according to article 27 of the
4. See generally Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Ensayo de sintesis comparativa sobre el
rdgimen del amparo en la legislacidn latinoamericana, in REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE
DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL, No. 9 enero-junio 2008, Editorial Porrfia, Instituto
Iberoamericano de Derecho Procesal Constitucional, Mxico 2008, pp. 311-321; Eduardo
Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Breves notas sobre el amparo latinoamericano (desde el derecho proce-
sal constitucional comparado), in HtCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO AND EDUARDO FERRER MAC-
GREGOR, EL DERECHO DE AMPARO EN EL MUNDO, Edit. Porrdia, M6xico, 2006, 3-39.
5. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 27 (1999); VENEZ. CONST. ART. 49 (1961). See generally, on the
action of amparo in Venezuela, Allan R. Brewer-Carias, INSTITUCIONES POLfrICAS Y
CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, Editorial Juridica Ve-
nezolana, Caracas, 1998; GUsTAVO BRICEI&O V., COMENTARIOS A LA LEY DE AMPARO, Edit.
Kinesis, Caracas, (1991); RAFAEL J. CHAVERO GAZDIK, EL NUEVO RIGIMEN DEL AMPARO
CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, Editorial Sherwood, Caracas, 2001; GUsTAVO Jost
LINARES BENZO, EL PROCESO DE AMPARO, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de
Ciencias Juridicas y Politicas, Caracas, (1999); HILDEGARD ROND6N DE SANS6, AMPARO
CONSTITUCIONAL, Caracas, (1988); Hildegard Rond6n De Sans6, LA ACCION DE AMPARO
163
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1999 Constitution everybody has for the protection of all the
rights, freedoms and guarantees enshrined in the constitution and
in international treaties, or which, even if not listed in the text,
are inherent to the human person. The constitution does not set
forth a separate action of habeas corpus for the protection of per-
sonal freedom and liberty; which are also protected by the action
for amparo. In this latter case of amparo for the protection of per-
sonal freedom or safety, it can be exercised by any person in which
cases "the detainee shall be immediately transferred to the court,
without delay" 6
Additionally, the Venezuelan Constitution has also set forth the
habeas data recourse, in order to guarantee the right to have ac-
cess to the information and data concerning the claimant, con-
tained in official or private registries. The habeas data recourse
also provides the right to know about the use that has been made
of such information concerning its purpose, and to petition the
competent court for the updating, rectification or destruction of
erroneous records that unlawfully affect the petitioner's rights.
The amparo proceeding has been regulated in the Organic Law
on Amparo for the protection of constitutional rights and guaran-
tees that was sanctioned in 1988 (Ley Orgdnica de Amparo sobre
derechos y garantias constitucionales).7 According to its provisions,
the right to amparo can be exercised through an "autonomous ac-
tion for amparo' 8 that is generally filed before the first instance
courts,9 with a reestablishing nature, in general regarding fla-
CONTRA LOS PODERES PfBLIcos, Editorial Arte, Caracas, (1994); Carlos M. Ayala Corao and
Rafael J. Chavero Gazidk, El amparo constitucional en Venezuela, in HitCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO
AND EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR (COORD.), EL DERECHO DE AMPARO EN EL MUNDO, Uni-
versidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mdxico, Editorial Porrfia, M6xico, 2006, 649-92.
6. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 27 (1999).
7. See Gaceta Oficial n. o 33.891 of January 22, 1988. On this Law, see Allan R. Bre-
wer-Carias, Carlos M. Ayala Corao & Rafael Chavero G., LEY ORGANICA DE AMPARO SOBRE
DERECHOS Y GARANTAS CONSTITUCIONALES, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2007.
8. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El derecho de amparo y la accidn de amparo, in
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n.° 22, Editorial Jurdica Venezolana, Caracas, 1985, 51 ff.
9. According to Article 7 of the Organic Law on Amparo, the competent courts to de-
cide amparo actions are the courts of First Instance with competence on matters related to
the constitutional rights or guarantees violated, in the place where the facts, acts or omis-
sion occurred. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 7. Regarding amparo of personal freedom and
security, the competent courts should be the criminal first instance courts. Venez. Amparo
Law, Art. 40. Nonetheless, when the facts, acts or omissions harming or threatening to
harm the constitutional right or guarantee occurs in a place where no First Instance court
exists, the amparo action may be brought before any judge of the site, which must decide
according to the law. Such judge must also, in a twenty-four hour delay, send the files for
consultation to the competent First Instance court. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 9. Only in
cases in which facts, acts or omissions of the President of the Republic, his cabinet mem-
bers, the National Electoral Council, the Prosecutor General, the Attorney General and the
164 Vol. 49
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grant, vulgar, direct and immediate constitutional harm to the
plaintiffs rights. The constitutional protection can also be
claimed by means of other preexisting ordinary or extraordinary
legal actions or recourses already established in the legal system
to which an amparo petition is joined. This can be the popular
action of unconstitutionality of statutes, the judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions' recourses, and any other "ordinary judicial
procedures" or "preexisting judicial means," through which the
"violation or threat of violation of a constitutional right or guaran-
ty may be alleged."'10 In these cases, in which a competent judge is
empowered to immediately reestablish the infringed legal situa-
tion, it is not that the ordinary means substitute the constitution-
al right of protection (or diminish it), but instead that they can
serve as the judicial means for constitutional litigation because
the judge is empowered to protect fundamental rights and imme-
diately reestablish the infringed legal situation."
These regulations result in the Venezuelan right for amparo,
which has certain peculiarities that distinguish it from the other
similar institutions for the protection of the constitutional rights
and guarantees established in Latin America. 12 Besides the adjec-
tive consequences of the amparo being a constitutional right in
Venezuela, it can be characterized by the following trends:
First, the right of amparo can be exercised for the protection of
all constitutional rights, not only of civil individual rights. Conse-
quently, the social, economic, cultural, environmental and political
rights declared in the constitution and in international treaties
are also protected by means of amparo. The habeas corpus provi-
sion is an aspect of the right to constitutional protection, or one of
the expressions of the amparo.
Second, the right to amparo seeks to assure protection of consti-
tutional rights and guarantees against any disturbance in their
enjoyment and exercise, whether originated by public authorities
or by private individuals, without distinction. In addition, in the
case of disturbance by public authorities, the amparo is admissible
General Comptroller of the Republic are involved does the power to decide the amparo
actions correspond to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice.
Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 8.
10. Venez. Amparo Law, Arts. 3, 4, 5
11. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La reciente evoluci6n jurisprudencial en relacidn a la
admisibilidad del recurso de amparo, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUIBLIcO, n.° 19, Caracas,
1984, pp. 207-218.
12. See generally H. FIX-ZAMUDIO, LA PROTECCI6N PROCESAL DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS ANTE LAS JURISDICCIONES NACIONALES, Madrid, 1982, 366.
165
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against statutes; against legislative, administrative and judicial
acts and against material or factual courses of action of Public
Administration or public officials.
Third, the decision of the judge, as a consequence of the exercise
of this right to amparo, whether through the preexisting actions or
recourses or by means of the autonomous action for amparo, is not
limited to being of a precautionary or preliminary nature, but to
reestablish the infringed legal situation by deciding on the merits,
that is, the constitutionality of the alleged disturbance of the con-
stitutional right.
Fourth, because the Venezuelan system of judicial review is a
mixed one, judicial review of legislation can also be exercised by
the courts when deciding an action for amparo when, for instance,
the alleged violation of the right is based on a statute deemed un-
constitutional. In such cases, if the protection requested is grant-
ed by the courts, it must previously declare the statute inapplica-
ble on the grounds of it being unconstitutional. Therefore, in such
cases, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation can also
be exercised when an action for amparo of fundamental rights is
filed.
Finally, in the Venezuelan systems of judicial review and of am-
paro, according to article 336.10 of the 1999 Constitution, an ex-
traordinary review recourse can be filed before the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court against judicial final decisions
issued in amparo proceedings, and also by any court when apply-
ing the diffuse method of judicial review resolving the inapplica-
bility of statutes because they are considered unconstitutional.
Following these main general trends, I will analyze the amparo
proceeding in Venezuela, studying the rules regarding the injured
party; the justiciable rights; the conditions of the injury; the repa-
rable character of harms and the restorative character of amparo;
the imminent character of threats and preventive character of the
amparo; the injuring party; the conditions of the injuring public
actions and omissions; the admissibility condition and the ex-
traordinary condition of the action; the rules of procedure; the pre-
liminary protective measures; and the final decision. In each case
where it proceeds I have made the corresponding comparisons
with civil rights injunctions in the United States.
Vol. 49
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III. THE INJURED PARTY IN THE AMPARO PROCEEDNG
One of the most distinguishable principles regarding the am-
paro proceeding as an extraordinary judicial means for the protec-
tion of constitutional rights is the principle of bilateralism, which
implies the need for the existence of a controversy between two or
more parties. The main consequence of this principle is that the
amparo proceeding can only be initiated at a party's request,
which excludes any case of ex officio amparo proceeding. 13
Consequently, in order to initiate this proceeding, an action
must be brought before a court by a plaintiff as the injured party,
against the injuring party or parties, who, as defendants, must be
called to the procedure as having caused the harm or the violation
to the constitutional rights of the former. 14
The injured party, in principle, is the person having the consti-
tutional right that has been violated, a situation that gives him a
particular interest in bringing the case before a court. That is
why the amparo action has been considered as an action in perso-
nam (personalisima) through which the plaintiff, seeking the pro-
tection of constitutional rights, must be the actual injured or ag-
grieved person.
Because the action has a personal character (acci6n person-
alisima), the plaintiff, as the person whose constitutional rights
have been injured or threatened of being harmed, 15 is the title-
holder of the harmed or violated right 16 and is the injured party
13. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARfAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
LATIN AMERICA,. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE AMPARO PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at
179.
14. Id.
15. See Decision of the former Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Adminis-
trative Chamber n.° 571 of Aug. 13, 1992, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n.' 51, Edito-
rial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, pp. 160-61.
16. Regarding injunctions in the United States the court in Parkview Hospital v.
Commw. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, held that bringing an action "requires an aggrieved party
showing a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the subject matter of the litiga-
tion." 424 A.2d 599, 600 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). See also 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 299. See
also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975) (the plaintiff must '"allege such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy"' as to justify the exercise of the court's reme-
dial powers on his behalf, because he himself has suffered '"some threatened or actual
injury resulting from the putatively illegal action."'). See M. GLENN ABERNATHY AND
BARBARA A. PERRY, CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 4 (6th ed. 1993). That is
why standing to seek injunctive relief in the United States is only attributed to the person
affected. See Ala. Power Co. v. Ala. Elec. Co-op., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1968); 43A C.J.S.
Injunctions § 200 (2004).
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with justiciable interest in the subject matter of the litigation,
which can be a natural person (citizens or foreigner), or an artifi-
cial person (associations, foundations, corporations or companies).
For this purpose the plaintiff can act directly, in personam, or
through his representative. 17 Thus, nobody can file an action for
amparo alleging in his own name a right belonging to another,
18
the general exception being the action of habeas corpus, in which
case, because generally the injured person is physically prevented
from acting personally because of detention or restrained freedom,
the Amparo Law authorizes anybody to file the action on his be-
half.19
On the other hand, as not all constitutional rights are individu-
al, and to the contrary, some are collective by nature, in the sense
that they correspond to a more or less defined group of persons,
their violations affect not only the personal rights of each of the
individuals who enjoy them, but also, the whole group of persons
or collectivity to which the individuals belong. In these cases the
amparo action can also be filed by the group or the association of
persons representing their associates, even if they do not have the
formal character of an artificial person. For such purpose, the
Venezuelan constitution expressly sets forth the constitutional
right of everybody to have access to justice, to seek for the en-
forcement not only of personal rights, but also of "collective" and
"diffuse" rights.20 This has been the case, for instance, of amparo
17. As it was ruled by the former Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela regarding the
personal character of the amparo suit, imposing for its admissibility:
A qualified interest of who is asking for the restitution or reestablishment of the
harmed right or guaranty, that is, that the harm be directed to him and that, eventu-
ally, its effects affect directly and indisputably upon him, harming his scope of sub-
jective rights guaranteed in the Constitution. It is only the person that is specially
and directly injured in his subjective fundamental rights by a specific act, fact or
omission the one that can bring an action before the competent courts by mean of a
brief and speedy proceeding, in order that the judge decides immediately the reestab-
lishment of the infringed subjective legal situation.
See decision n.° 460 of Aug. 27, 1993, Kenet E. Leal case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO,
n.' 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, p. 322; and decision of the Vene-
zuelan First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, Nov. 18, 1993 (Goberna-
ci6n del Estado Miranda case), in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 55-56, Editorial Juri-
dica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp. 325-327.
18. See decision of the former Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Adminis-
trative Chamber, n.' 72 of Feb. 14, 1990, Carlos Coll case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PBLICO, n.° 41, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, p. 101.
19. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 41 (anybody acting on his behalf).
20. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 26. The Constitutional Chamber has referred to the diffuse
and collective interests or rights as concepts established for the protection of a number of
individuals that can be considered as representing the entire, or at least an important part
of a society, which are affected on their constitutional rights and guarantees destined to
Vol. 49168
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actions filed for the protection of electoral rights, in which case,
any citizen, invoking the general voters' rights, can file the ac-
tion.21 In other words, the Constitutional Chamber has admitted
that: "Any capable person that tends to impede harm to the popu-
lation or sectors of it to which he appertains, can file actions in
defense of diffuse or collective interest," extending the "standing to
the associations, societies, foundations, chambers, trade unions
and other collective entities devoted to defend society, provided
that they act within the limits of their societal goals referring to
the protection of the interests of their members."
22
In these cases, the Constitutional Chamber has determined that
the action filed must be based "not only on the personal right or
interest of the claimant, but also on a common or collective right
or interest. 23  Consequently, in these cases, a bond or relation
must exist, "even if it is not a legal one, between whoever demands
protect the public welfare by an attack to their quality of life. See decision of the Constitu-
tional Chamber n" 656 of June 30, 2000, Defensor del Pueblo vs. Comisi6n Legislativa
Nacional case, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Junio/656-300600-00-
1728%20.htm. See also decision of the same Constitucional Chamber n* 379 of Feb. 26, 2003,
Mireya Ripanti et vs. Presidente de Petr6leos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) case, in REVISTA
DE DERECHO POBLICO, n ° 93-96, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2003, pp. 152 ff.
21. In these cases, the Chamber has even granted precautionary measures with erga
omnes effects "to both individuals and corporations who have brought to suit the constitu-
tional protection, and to all voters as a group." See Decision of the Constitutional Chamber
n° 483 of May 29, 2000, "Queremos Elegir"y otros case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, n*
82, 2000, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, pp. 489-491. In the same sense, see the decision
of the same Chamber n' 714 of July 13, 2000, APRUM case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
POBLICO, n° 83, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2000, pp. 319 ff.
22. The Chamber added that:
Those who file actions regarding the defense of diffuse interest do not need to have
any previously established relation with the offender, but has to act as a member of
society, or of its general categories (consumers, users, etc.) and has to invoke his right
or interest shared with the population's, because he participates with all regarding
the harmed factual situation due to the noncompliance of the diminution of funda-
mental rights of everybody, which gives birth to a communal subjective right, that
although indivisible, is actionable by any one place within the infringed situation.
See decision of June 30, 2000, Defensoria del Pueblo case, available at
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Junio/656-300600-00-1728%20.htm. See the comments in
RAFAEL CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra
note 5, pp. 110-114.
23. That is, the reason of the claim or the action for amparo must be "the general dam-
age to the quality of life of all the inhabitants of the country or parts of it, since the legal
situation of all the members of the society or its groups have been damaged when their
common quality of life was worsened." Thus, the damage "concerns an indivisible right or
interest that involves the entire population of the country or a group of it." Decision n
1048 of Aug. 17, 2000, William 0. Ojeda 0. vs. Consejo Nacional Electoral case, available at
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisioneslscon/agosto/1053-310800-00-2397%20.htm.
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in the general interest of the society or a part of it (social common
interest), and the damage or danger caused to the collectivity.
'24
These collective actions have some similarities with the civil
rights class actions developed in the United States,25 which have
been very effective for the protection of civil rights in cases of dis-
crimination.
26
24. See Decision n' 1048 of Aug. 17, 2000, William 0. Ojeda 0. vs. Consejo Nacional
Electoral case, http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/agosto/1053-310800-00-2397%20.htm.
In spite of all the aforementioned progressive decisions regarding the protection of collec-
tive and diffuse rights, like the political ones, in a decision dated Nov. 24, 2005, the Vene-
zuelan Constitutional Chamber has reverted its ruling, and in a case originated by a claim
filed by the director of a political association named "'_n Solo Pueblo" against the threat of
violations of the political rights of the aforesaid political party and of all the other support-
ers of the calling of a recall referendum regarding the President of the Republic, the Cham-
ber ruled that:
The action of amparo was filed for the protection of constitutional rights of an unde-
termined number of persons, whose identity was not indicated in the filing document,
in which they are not included as claimants. It is the criteria of this Chamber, those
that could result directly affected in their constitutional rights and guaranties by the
alleged threat attributed to the Ministry of Defense and the General Commanders of
the Army and the National Guard are, precisely, the persons that are members or
supporters of "Un Solo Pueblo," or those who prove they are part of one of the groups
that promoted the recall referendum; in which case they would have standing to
bring before the constitutional judge, by themselves or through representatives, seek-
ing the reestablishment of the infringed juridical situation or impeding the realiza-
tion of the threat, because the legitimatio ad causam exists in each one of them, not
precisely as constitutionally harmed or aggrieved. Due to the foregoing, the Chamber
considers that Mr. William Ojeda, who said he acted as Director of the political asso-
ciation called "Un S61o Pueblo," a quality that he furthermore has not demonstrated,
lacks the necessary standing to seek for constitutional amparo of the constitutional
rights set forth in Articles 19, 21 and 68 of the constitution regarding the members,
supporters and participants of the mentioned political association as well as the polit-
ical coalition that proposed the recall referendum of the President of the Republic,
and consequently, this Chamber declares the inadmissibility of the amparo action
filed.
See Decision n' 3550 of Nov. 24, 2005, Willian Ojeda vs. Ministro de la Defensa y los Co-
mandantes Generales del Ejercito y de la Guardia Nacional case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
POBLICO, n° 104, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2005, pp. 231 ff.
25. Regulated in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed for the protection
of civil rights, according to which, in cases of a class of persons whom have "questions of
law or fact common to the class," but have so many members that joining all of them would
be an impracticable task, then the action can be filed by one or more of its members as
representative plaintiff parties on behalf of all, provided that the claims of the representa-
tive parties are "typical of the claims ... of the class" and that such "representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
26. It was the case decided by the Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, as a result of
a class action brought before a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Wisconsin residents
holding that the marriage prohibition set forth in Wisconsin Statute § 245.10 violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
434 U.S. 374, 375-77 (1978). According to that statute, Wisconsin residents were prevented
from marrying if they were behind in their child support obligations or if the children to
whom they were obligated were likely to become public charges. Zablocki, 434 U.S. 377.
The Court found that the statute violated equal protection in that it "directly and substan-
tially" interfered with the fundamental right to marry, without being closely tailored to
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Although being of a personal character, even in cases of actions
for the protection of collective and diffuse rights, the People's De-
fendant was created in Venezuela as an independent and autono-
mous separate branch of government for the protection of human
rights,27 having enough standing to file amparo actions on behalf
of the community or groups of persons. 28 For example, standing is
extended to cases of the protection of indigenous peoples' rights,
the right to the environment and the citizens' right to political
participation.
29
effectuate the state's interests. Id. at 382, 387. Another Supreme Court decision, Lau v.
Nichols, also decided in favor of a class on discrimination violations. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
In the case, non-English-speaking students of Chinese ancestry brought a class suit in a
federal court of California against officials of the San Francisco Unified School District,
seeking relief against alleged unequal educational opportunities resulting from the officials'
failure to establish a program to rectify the students' language problem. Lau, 414 U.S. at
564-65. The Supreme Court eventually held that the school district, which received federal
financial assistance, violated statutes that ban discrimination based on race, color, or na-
tional origin in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, and further-
more violated the implementing regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare by failing to establish a program to deal with the complaining students' language
problem. Id. at 568-69.
27. The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution, in this regard, establishes a separation of pow-
ers, distinguishing five branches of government, separating the Legislative, Executive,
Judicial, Electoral and Citizens branches; creating the People's Defendant within the Citi-
zens Power, in addition to the Public Prosecutor Office and the General Comptroller Office.
VENEZ. CONST. ART. 134 (1999). The People's Defendant was created for the promotion,
defense and supervision of the rights and guarantees set forth in the constitution and in
the international treaties on human rights, as well as for the citizens' legitimate, collective
and diffuse interests. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 281 (1999). In particular, according to Article
281 of the constitution, it also has among its functions to watch for the functioning of public
services power and to promote and protect the peoples' legitimate, collective and diffuse
rights and interests against arbitrariness or deviation of power in the rendering of such
services, being authorized to file the necessary actions to ask for the compensation of the
damages caused from the malfunctioning of public services. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 281
(1999). It also has among its functions, the possibility of filing actions of amparo and habe-
as corpus.
28. The courts have declared that the Defender has standing to bring to suit actions
aimed at enforcing the diffuse and collective rights or interests; not being necessary the
requirement of the acquiescence of the society it acts on behalf of for the exercise of the
action. See Decision n' 1051 of Aug. 2, 2000 of the Venezuelan First Court on Judicial Re-
view of Administrative Actions, Henry Lima et al. case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POiBLICO,
n ° 83, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2000, pp. 326-27.
29. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Venezuela admitted the
standing of the Defender of the People to file actions for amparo on behalf of the citizens as
a whole, as was the case of the action filed against the legislative body pretension to ap-
point the Electoral National Council members without fulfilling the constitutional require-
ments. In the case, decided on June 30, 2000, the Constitutional Chamber, when analyzing
Article 280 of the constitution, in its decision n' 656 pointed out that "the protection of
diffuse and collective rights and interests may be raised by the Defender of the People,
through the action of amparo," adding the following:
As for the general provision of Article 280 eiusdem, regarding the general defense
and protection of diffuse and collective interests, this Chamber considers that the De-
fender of the People is entitled to act to protect those rights and interests, when they
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IV. THE JUSTICIABLE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES
THROUGH THE AMPARO PROCEEDING
As a matter of principle in Venezuela, all rights and guarantees
enshrined in the constitution or those that have acquired constitu-
tional rank and value are justiciable30 rights by means of the am-
paro action. That is, they have to be, in spite of being regulated in
statutes, out of the reach of the legislator in the sense that they
cannot be eliminated, or diminished through statutes.
The consequence of this principle is that the purpose of the am-
paro actions is to protect individuals against violations of the
"constitutional" provision regarding their right; not being able to
file an action for amparo simply based on the violation of the
"statutory" provisions that regulate the constitutional right. For
instance, as it happens with the right to property, regarding which
an amparo action for its protection can be admitted when, for ex-
ample, arbitrary administrative acts prevent or impede in abso-
lute terms the use of property. On the contrary, it is not admitted
correspond in general to the consumers and users (6, Article 281), or to protect the
rights of Indian peoples (paragraph 8 of the same Article), since the defense and pro-
tection of such categories is one of the faculties granted to said entity by Article 281
of the Constitution in force. It is about a general protection and not a protection of
individualities. Within this frame of action, and since the political rights are included
in the human rights and guaranties of Title III of the Constitution in force, which
have a general projection, among which the ones provided in Article 62 of the Consti-
tution can be found, it must be concluded that the Defender of the People on behalf of
the society, legitimated by law, is entitled to bring to suit an action of amparo tend-
ing to control the Electoral Power, to the citizen's benefit, in order to enforce Articles
62 and 70 of the Constitution, which were denounced to be breached by the National
Legislative Assembly... (right to citizen participation). Due to the difference between
diffuse and collective interests, both the Defender of the People, within its attribu-
tions, and every individual residing in the country, except for the legal exceptions,
are entitled to bring to suit the action (be it of amparo or an specific one) for the pro-
tection of the former ones; while the action of the collective interests is given to the
Defender of the People and to any member of the group or sector identified as a com-
ponent of that specific collectivity, and acting defending the collectivity. Both indi-
viduals and corporations whose object be the protection of such interests may raise
the action, and the standing in all these actions varies according to the nature of the
same, that is why law can limit the action in specific individuals or entities. However,
in our Constitution, in the provisions of Article 281 the Defender of the People is ob-
jectively granted the procedural interest and the capacity to sue.
See Decision of the Constitutional Chamber n* 656 of June 30, 2000, Defensor del Pueblo us.
Comisiun Legislatiua Nacional case, available at
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Junio/656-300600-00-1728%20.htm. See also Decision n' 379
of February 26, 2003, Mireya Ripanti et vs. Presidente de Petrdleos de Venezuela S.A.
(PDVSA) case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PIYBLICO, n* 93-96, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 2003, pp. 152 ff.
30. "Justiciability" being defined as 'The quality or state of being appropriate or suita-
ble for review by courts;" and "Justiciable," as "capable of being disposed of judicially."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (8th ed. 2004).
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for the protection of property, for instance, against trespassing. In
these cases, the ordinary civil judicial expedite actions (interdic-
tos) are the ones that should be filed.
31
In general terms, this implies the extraordinary character of the
amparo action, in the sense that it can only be filed when no other
appropriate and effective ordinary judicial means for protection
are legally provided or when if such protections are provided, they
are ineffective.
This condition of admissibility of the amparo actions is very sim-
ilar to the so-called "inadequacy" condition established in the
United States regarding the equitable injunction remedies, in the
sense that they are only admissible when there are no adequate
remedies in law to assure the protection; or when the law cannot
provide an adequate remedy because of the nature of the right
involved, as was the case regarding school segregation. 3
2
31. Property rights are not only established in the constitutions but are also extensive-
ly regulated in the Civil Code. The latter not only contains substantive regulations regard-
ing the exercise of such rights, but it also provides for adjective ordinary remedies in case
those rights are affected. In particular, the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Codes estab-
lishes some sort of civil injunctions to guarantee immediate protection in cases of trespass-
es (interdictos) for instance of possession rights, which are effective judicial remedies for
the protection of land owners or occupant rights. Thus, in cases of property trespass, the
interdicto de amparo or of new construction are effective judicial means for protection of
property rights, not being possible to file an amparo action in such cases. In this regard,
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela, in a case
decided in 2000, argued as follows:
The amparo action protects one aspect of the legal situations of persons referred to
their fundamental rights, corresponding the defense of subjective rights - different to
fundamental rights and public liberties - to the ordinary administrative and judicial
recourses and actions. For instance, it is not the same to deny a citizen the condition
to have property rights, than to discuss property rights between parties, the protec-
tion of which corresponds to a specific ordinary judicial action of recovery (reivindi-
caci6n). This means that in the amparo proceedings the court judges the actions of
public entities or individuals that can harm fundamental rights; but in no case can it
review, for instance, the applicability or interpretation or statutes by Public Admin-
istration or the courts, unless from them a direct violation of the Constitution can be
deduced. The amparo is not a new judicial instance, nor the substitution of ordinary
judicial means for the protection of rights and interest; it is an instrument to reaffirm
constitutional values, by mean of which the court, hearing an amparo, can decide re-
garding the contents or the application of constitutional provisions regulating fun-
damental rights; can review the interpretation made by Public Administration or ju-
dicial bodies, or determine if the facts from which constitutional violations are de-
duced constitute a direct violation of the Constitution.
See Decision n ° 828 of July 27, 2000, Seguros Corporativos (SEGUCORP), C.A. et al. vs.
Superintedencia de Seguros case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PIBLIco, n 83, Editorial Juridi-
ca Venezolana, Caracas, 2000, pp. 290 ff.
32. See OWEN M. FIss & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONs, 59 (2nd ed. 1984). This
inadequacy condition, of course, normally results from the factual situations regarding the
case or from the nature of the right, which in some cases impedes or allows the granting of
the protection. In this sense, for instance, it was resolved since the well-known case of
Wheelock v. Nooman, 15 N.E. 67 (N.Y. 1888), in which case the defendant, having left on
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The rights protected by the amparo action are the "constitution-
al rights," that comprise of first, rights expressly declared in the
constitution. Second, are those rights that are not enumerated in
the constitution and are inherent to human beings. Third, are the
rights enumerated in international instruments on human rights
ratified by the state, that in Venezuela have constitutional rank
being applied with preference in all cases in which they provide
more favorable conditions for the enjoyment of the right.33 Conse-
quently, all the rights listed in Title III of the constitution, which
refer to human rights, guarantees and duties, are protected by the
amparo action. Those rights include citizenship rights, civil (indi-
vidual) rights, political rights, social and familial rights, cultural
and educational rights, economic rights, environmental rights and
the rights of indigenous peoples enumerated in Articles 19 to 129.
Additionally, all other constitutional rights and guarantees de-
rived from other constitutional provisions can also be protected
even if not included in Title III, such as the constitutional guaran-
tee of the independence of the judiciary, or the constitutional
guarantee of the legality of taxation (that taxes can only by set
forth by statute).34 Also, regarding the protected rights, through
the open clause of constitutional rights, the constitution admits
the amparo action for the protection of those other constitutional
rights and guaranties not expressly listed in the constitution, but
that can be considered inherent to human beings.
35
The most important question regarding the justiciability of con-
stitutional rights refers to the scope of the protection of social
rights, and in particular the right of the people to have their
health protected by the state,36 and the obligation of the state to
provide public health services. In this regard, the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela in a
the plaintiffs property great boulders beyond the authorization he had, the injunction was
granted in order to require such defendant to remove them. Wheelock, 15 N.E. at 67-70.
The plaintiff in the case could not easily remove the boulders and sued the cost of removal
of the trespassing rocks because of their size and weight. Id. at 69. On the contrary, in
another case, the remedy at law was considered adequate because the litter the defendant
left on the property could be removed by the plaintiff paying for someone to remove the
trash, in which case he could simply sue the defendant for the cost incurred. Connor v.
Grosso, 529 P.2d 435 (Cal. 1953).
33. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 23.
34. See BREWER-CARiAS, INSTITUCIONES POLTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL
DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 209. See Decision of the First Court on
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fecadove case, in Rafael Chavero G., EL NUEVO
R9GIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at p. 157.
35. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 22.
36. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 83.
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decision (Glenda L6pez y otros vs. Instituto Venezolano de los Se-
guros Sociales) pointed out that the right to health or to the pro-
tection of health is:
an integral part of the right to life, set forth in the Constitu-
tion as a fundamental social right (and not simply as an as-
signment of State purposes) whose satisfaction mainly be-
longs to the State and its institutions, through activities in-
tended to progressively raise the quality of life of citizens and
the collective welfare.
37
This, according to the Court's decision, implies that "the right to
health is not to be exhausted with the simple physical care of a
person, but must be extended to the appropriate treatment in or-
der to safeguard the mental, social, environmental integrity of
persons, including the community." 38
V. THE INJURY IN THE AMPARO PROCEEDING
The injuries violating constitutional rights, against which the
amparo action is established, can consist of harms or threats af-
fecting those rights. Harms are always damages affecting or de-
stroying the object of the right; and threats are injuries that,
without destroying such object, put the enjoyment of the right in a
situation of danger or of suffering a detriment.
In order to be protected by means of the amparo proceeding,
these injuries-harms or threats-caused to constitutional rights,
must be evident, actual and real, that is, they must affect person-
ally and directly the rights of the plaintiff, in a manifestly arbi-
trary, illegal and illegitimate way, which the plaintiff must not
have consented to.
In addition to these general conditions, specifically regarding
harms, they must have a reparable character. Regarding threats,
they must affect the rights in an imminent way. That is why the
type of injuries inflicted on constitutional rights furthers the pur-
pose for the amparo proceeding: if harms, being reparable, the
amparo has a restorative effect; and if threats, being imminent,
the amparo has a preventive effect.
37. Decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Vene-
zuela n' 487 of Apr. 6, 2001, Glenda Ldpez y otros vs. Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros
Sociales case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PTiBLICO, n' 85-88, Editorial Juridica Venezulana,
Caracas, 2001, pp. 139 ff.
38. Id.
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Regarding the general conditions with which the injuries to con-
stitutional rights must comply in order for an amparo actions to be
admitted, the following are established in the Amparo Law. First,
it must have a personal and direct character, in the sense that it
must personally affect the plaintiff. Second, it must be actual and
real. Third, it must be manifestly or ostensibly arbitrary, illegal
and illegitimate. Fourth, it must be evidenced in the case. Final-
ly, it must not be consented to by the plaintiff.
The first condition of the injury inflicted upon the plaintiffs
constitutional rights, in order for an amparo action to be admitted,
is that the plaintiff must have suffered a "direct, personal and
present harm or threat in his constitutional rights."'39 That is, the
plaintiff must be personally affected. Consequently, the amparo
action cannot be filed when the affected rights belong to another
person, separate from the claimant or only affects the plaintiff in
an indirect way.
If the harm does not affect the constitutional rights of the plain-
tiff in a personal and direct way, the action must be considered
inadmissible. The action is also inadmissible when the harm or
threat is not attributed to the person identified as the injuring
party, that is, when the injury is not personally caused by the de-
fendant.40
39. For example, it has been ruled by the courts in Venezuela that: "[i]t is necessary,
though, that the denounced actions directly affect the subjective sphere of the claimant,
consequently excluding the generic conducts, even if they can affect in a tangential way on
the matter." See Decision of the First Court on Juricial Review of Administrative Actions of
Dec. 2, 1993, in REvISTA DE DERECHO P(JBLICO, no 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1993, pp. 302-303.
40. In this sense, for instance, it was decided by the former Supreme Court of Justice in
1999, in an amparo filed against the President of the Republic, denouncing as the injuring
acts, possible measures to be adopted by the National Constituent Assembly that the Pres-
ident had convened, once installed. The Court rejected the action considering that "the
reasons alleged by the plaintiff were of eventual and hypothetical nature, which contradicts
the need of an objective and real harm or threat to constitutional rights or guaranties" in
order for the amparo to be admissible. Regarding the alleged defendant in the case, the
Court ruled as follows:
This court must say that the action for constitutional amparo serves to give protec-
tion against situations that in a direct way could produce harm regarding the plain-
tiff's constitutional rights or guaranties, seeking the restoration of its infringed jurid-
ical situation. In this case, the person identified as plaintiff (President of the Repub-
lic) could not be by himself the one to produce the eventual harm which would condi-
tion the voting rights of the plaintiff, and the fear that the organization of the consti-
tuted branches of government could be modified, would be attributed to the members
of those that could be elected to the National Constituent Assembly not yet elected.
Thus in the case there does not exist the immediate relation between the plaintiff
and the defendants needed in the amparo suit.
See the reference to the Decision of Apr. 23, 1999 (A. Albornoz case), in RAFAEL CHAVERO,
EL NUEVO R9GIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at p. 240.
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However, in addition to directly affecting the constitutional
rights of the plaintiff, the injury must be "actual," in the sense
that at the moment of the filing of the action, the harm or threat
must be presently occurring and must not have ceased or conclud-
ed.
This same rule is also applied in the United States regarding in-
junctions, in the sense that for a person to be entitled to injunctive
relief, he or she must establish an actual, substantial and serious
injury, or an affirmative prospect of such an injury. Consequently,
a petitioner is not entitled to an injunction where no injury to the
petitioner is shown from the action sought to be prevented.41
In other words, the injury must be real, in the sense that it
must have effectively occurred; a fact that must be clearly demon-
strated by the plaintiff in his petition. That is why the Venezue-
lan courts have ruled that:
The amparo action can only be directed against a perfectly
and determined act or omission, and not against a generic
conduct; against an objective and real activity and not against
a supposition regarding the intention of the presumed injurer,
and against the direct and immediate consequences of the ac-
tivities of the public body or officer.
42
This actual and real character of the injury necessary to sustain
an amparo suit implies that it cannot be a past injury, or one like-
ly to occur in the future. In this sense the Venezuelan courts have
argued that the injury "must be alive, must be present in all its
intensity," in the sense that "referring to the present, not to the
past; it does not refer to facts that already had happened, which
41. See Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
42. Decision of the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber,
of Dec. 2, 1993, in which the Court added, "that is why the amparo action is not a popular
action for denouncing the illegitimacy of the public entities of control over convenience or
opportunity, but a protector remedy of the claimant sphere when it is demonstrated that it
has been directly affected," in REVISTA DE DERECHO PTBLICO, n' 55-56, Editorial Jurdica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp. 302-303. In another decision, the same former Supreme
Court of Justice ruled about the need that: 'The violation of the constitutional rights and
guaranties be a direct and immediate consequence of the act, fact or omission, not being
possible to attribute or assign to the injurer agent different results to those produced or to
be produced. The right's violation must be the product of the harming act." Decision n ° 398
of Aug. 14, 1992, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n° 51, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1992, p. 145.
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appertain to the past, but to present situations, which can be pro-
longed during an indefinite length of time."
43
Based precisely on this condition, the former Supreme Court of
Justice of Venezuela rejected the possibility of filing amparo ac-
tions against statutes, in cases in which they are not directly ap-
plicable, needing additional acts for their execution.
44
On the other hand, this same condition that the harm or threat
be actual implies that it must not have ceased or concluded, as
could happen, for instance, when, in the course of the procedure,
the challenged act is repealed.45 Consequently, in order to grant
the amparo protection, the Venezuelan courts have ruled that the
harm must not have ceased before the judge's decision is adopted.
On the contrary, if the harm has ceased, the judge in limine litis
must declare the inadmissibility of the action.46 For instance, in
the case of amparo actions against judicial omissions, if before the
filing of the action or during the proceeding, the court has issued
its decision, the harm can be considered as having ceased 47 and
the amparo action must be declared inadmissible. The same prin-
43. See Decision of the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, May,
7 1987, Desarrollo 77 C.A. case, in FUNEDA 15 AROS DE JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA CORTE
PRIMERA DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINSITRATIVO 1977-1992, Caracas, 1994, p. 78. In this
sense, Article 6,1 of the Amparo Law establishes for the admissibility of the amparo action,
that the violation "must be actual, recent, alive." Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.1.
44. The Court ruled:
When an amparo action is filed against a norm, that is, when the object of the action
is the norm in itself, the concretion of the possible alleged harm would not be "imme-
diate," due to the fact that it would always be necessary for the competent authority
to proceed to the execution or application of the norm, in order to harm the plaintiff.
One must conclude that the probable harm caused by a norm will always be mediate
and indirect, needing to be applied to the concrete case. Thus, the injury will be
caused through and by means of an act applying the disposition that is contrary to
the rule of law.
Decision n' 315 of the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber,
May 24, 1993, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PfPBLICO, n' 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1993, pp. 289-90.
45. In this regard, the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions of
Venezuela resolved the inadmissibility of an action for amparo because, during the proceed-
ings, the challenged act was repealed. Decision of Aug. 14, 1992, Josg V Colmenares case,
in REVISTA DE DERECHO PtBLICO, n0 51, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, p.
154.
46. Decision n 651 of Dec. 15, 1992, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PtBLICO n* 52, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, p. 164; See First Court on Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Action, Decision of Dec. 12, 1992; Allan R. Brewer-Carias case, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO PItBLICO, n' 49, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, pp. 131-132; Deci-
sion n 210 of the Former Supreme Court, Politico Administrative Chamber of May 27,
1993, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUJBLICO, n' 53-54, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
1993, p. 264.
47. See CHAVERO, EL NUEVO REGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA,
supra note 5, at 237-38.
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ciple applies in the United States regarding the actual character
of the harm for granting the injunctive protection because the rule
in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist, not only
at the time of the filing of the action, but at all stages of the pro-
ceeding, even at appellate or certiorari review stages.
48
Nonetheless, this principle of the actual character of the injury
has some exceptions. For instance, in Venezuela, the exception
involves the effects already produced by a challenged act. Because
additional suits are necessary in order to establish civil liabilities
and compensation, even if the effects of the challenged act have
ceased, the amparo protection can be granted in order for the re-
sponsible person to be judicially determined, allowing the subse-
quent filing of an action seeking compensation.
In order for an amparo action to be admitted, in addition to the
injury being a direct, real and actual one, the harm or threat to
the constitutional right must be manifestly arbitrary, illegal or
illegitimate. Regarding public authorities' acts, this general con-
dition of admissibility of the amparo action derives from the gen-
eral public law principle of the presumption of validity that benefit
the state's acts, which implies that in order to overcome such a
presumption, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury
caused is manifestly illegal and arbitrary. The same principle ap-
plies in the United States, imposing on the plaintiff in civil right
injunctions against administrative officials, the burden to prove
48. Nonetheless, in the important case Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court expanded
women's right to privacy, striking down states' laws banning abortion. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The Court recognized that even if this right of privacy was not explicitly mentioned in the
constitution, it was guaranteed as a constitutional right for protecting "a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," even though admitting that the states' legisla-
tion could regulate the factors governing the abortion decision at some point in pregnancy
based on "safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards and in protecting potential
life." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The point in the case was that, pending the procedure, the
pregnancy period of the claimant came to term, so the injury claimed lost its present char-
acter. See id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled in the case that:
[when], as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day
human generation period is so short that pregnancy will come to term before the
usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnan-
cy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review
will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy comes more
than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it
will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of
nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Id. at 125. See ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 16, at 4-5.
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the alleged violations in order to destroy the presumption of valid-
ity of official acts.
49
The consequence of this condition is that the challenged act or
omission must be manifestly contrary to the legal order, that is,
contrary to the rules of law contained in the constitution, the stat-
utes and the executive regulations. It must be manifestly illegiti-
mate and lacking any legal support, or manifestly arbitrary by
resulting from an unreasonable or unjust decision, which is con-
trary to justice or to reason.
The condition of the injury-harm or threats-to be manifestly
arbitrary, illegal and illegitimate and to affect in a direct and im-
mediate way the plaintiff rights, implies that for the filing of the
amparo action, it must be evident, thus, directly imposing on the
plaintiff the burden to prove his assertions. That is, the plaintiff
has the burden to overcome the presumption of validity and must
base his arguments on a reasonable basis by proving the unrea-
sonable character of the public officer's challenged act or omission,
and that it has personally and directly harmed his rights. Also in
this matter, the rule in the amparo proceeding is similar to the
rules on matters of injunctions, as they have been resolved by the
United States' courts, according to which, "the party seeking an
injunction, whether permanent or temporary, must establish some
demonstrable injury."50
Consequently, in the amparo proceeding, it is for the plaintiff to
prove the harm or the threats caused to his rights as being caused
precisely by the defendant. This implies that when the proof of
the harms or threats can be established by means of written evi-
dence (documents, for instance), they must always be filed with
the complaint in order to illustrate this to the court.
51
Finally, the injury to constitutional rights which allows the fil-
ing of an amparo action must not only be actual, possible, real and
49. ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 16, at 5. As M. Glenn Abernathy and Perry have
commented:
The courts do not automatically presume that all restraints on free choice are im-
proper. The burden is thrown on the person attacking such acts to prove that they
are improper. This is most readily seen in cases involving the claim that an act of the
legislature is unconstitutional.... Judges also argue that acts of administrative offi-
cials should be accorded some presumption of validity. Thus a health officer who de-
stroys food alleged by him to be unfit for consumption is presumed to have good rea-
son for his action. The person whose property is so destroyed must bear the burden of
proving bad faith on part of the official, if an action is brought as a consequence.
See ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 16, at 5.
50. See 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 36 (2010) (citing Mt. Emmons Min. Co. v. Town of
Crested Butte, 690 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1984).
51. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 18.6.
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imminent, but must also be an injury that has not been consented
to by the plaintiff, who, in addition, must not have provoked it.
That is, the plaintiff must not have expressly or tacitly consented
to the challenged act or the harm caused to his rights. On the con-
trary, the amparo action would be considered inadmissible. The
Amparo Law in this matter distinguishes two sorts of possible
ways of consenting conducts: the express consent and the tacit
consent, each with some exceptions.
Express consent, as established in article 6.4 of the Venezuelan
Amparo Law, exists when there are "unequivocal signs of ac-
ceptance" by the plaintiff, of the acts, facts or omissions causing
the injury, in which case the amparo action is inadmissible. 52 In
certain aspects, this inadmissibility clause for the amparo proceed-
ing when an express consent of the plaintiff exists also has some
equivalence to the United States injunctions procedure with the
equitable defense called "estoppel." Estoppel refers to actions of
the plaintiff prior to the filing of the suit, when being inconsistent
with the rights he is asserting in his claim.53
Apart from the cases of express consent, the other clause of in-
admissibility in the amparo proceeding occurs in cases of tacit
consent by the plaintiff regarding the act, fact or omission causing
the injury to his rights. Tacit consent occurs when the precise
term, legally established to file the complaint, has elapsed without
the action being brought before the courts. This clause for the in-
admissibility of the amparo suit is equivalent to the United States
procedure for injunction called "laches," which seeks to prevent a
plaintiff from obtaining equitable relief when he has not acted
promptly in bringing the action, which is summarized in the
phrase, that "equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber in
their rights."54 The difference between the doctrine of "laches" and
52. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.4 (six months).
53. See WILLIAM M. TABB & ELAINE W. SHOBEN, REMEDIES, 50-51 (3d ed. 2005). The
classic example of estoppel, as referred to by Tabb and Shoben:
is that a plaintiff cannot ask equity for an order to remove a neighbor's fence built
over the lot line if the plaintiff stood by and watched the fence construction in full
knowledge of the location of the lot line. The plaintiffs silence with knowledge of the
facts is an action inconsistent with the right asserted in court.
Id.
54. Id. at 48. As the court stated in Lake Dev. Enter. Inc. v. Kojetinsky, 410 S.W.2d
361, 367-68 (Mo. App. 1966):
'Laches' is the neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time under cir-
cumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law, should have been done. There is
no fixed period within which a person must assert his claim or be barred by laches.
The length of time depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Mere delay
in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches; the delay involved must work
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the Venezuelan Law concept of tacit consent, basically lies in the
fact that the term to file the amparo action is expressly estab-
lished in the Amparo Law55 so the exhaustion of the term without
the filing of the action results in tacit consent regarding the act,
the fact or the omission causing the injury.
The sense of this clause of inadmissibility of the amparo action
was summarized by the former Supreme Court of Justice of Vene-
zuela when ruling as follows:
Since the amparo action is a special, brief, summary and ef-
fective judicial remedy for the protection of constitutional
rights ... it is logical for the Legislator to prescribe a precise
length of time between the moment in which the harm is pro-
duced and the moment the aggrieved party has to file the ac-
tion. To let more than 6 months pass from the moment in
which the injuring act is issued for the exercise of the action is
the demonstration of the acceptance of the harm from the side
of the injured party. His indolence must be sanctioned, imped-
ing the use of the judicial remedy that has its justification in
the urgent need to reestablish a legal situation.
56
However, regarding the effect of tacit consent, an exception has
been established in the Venezuelan Amparo Law in cases of viola-
tions affecting "public order" provisions, 57 which refer to situations
where the application of a statute may concern the general and
indispensable legal order for the existence of the community. The
to the disadvantage and prejudice of the defendant. Laches is a question of fact to be
determined from all the evidence and circumstances adduced at trial.
Id.
55. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.4 (six months).
56. Decision n ° 555 of Oct. 24, 1990, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, no 44, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, p. 144.
57. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.4. See Decision no 177 of the former Supreme Court of
Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber, of June 30, 1992, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PITBLICO, n° 50, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, p. 157. Public order has
been defined by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice as "a value
destined to maintain the necessary harmony basic for the development and integration of
society." See Decision n° 1104 of May 25, 2006 of the (quoting Decision No. 144 of March 20,
2000), in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUJBLICO, n
° 
106, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas
2006, p. 146. Consequently the concept of public order allows the general interest of the
Society and of the State to prevail over the individual particular interest, in order to assure
the enforcement and purpose of some institutions. For such purpose in many cases, it is
the legislator itself that has expressly declared in a particular statute that its provisions
are of "public order" character, in the sense that its norms cannot be modified through
private agreements between parties See Decision no 105 of former Supreme Court of Jus-
tice, Politico Administrative Chamber, Mar. 22, 1988, IN REVISTA DE DERECHO PftBLICO, no
34, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1988, p. 114.
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exception, of course, cannot be applied in cases only concerning
the parties in a contractual or private controversy.
This notion of "public order" is important because even when
the term to sue has elapsed without the action being filed, the
courts can admit the action because of reasons of "public order,"
not considered applicable in the case of tacit consent. As was de-
cided by the Venezuelan First Court of Administrative Judicial Re-
view:
The extinction of the amparo action due to the elapse of the
term to sue... is produced in all cases, except when the way
through which the harm has been produced is of such gravity
that it constitutes an injury to the juridical conscience. It
would be the case, for instance, of flagrant violations to indi-
vidual rights that cannot be denounced by the affected party;
deprivation of freedom; submission to physical or psychologi-
cal torture; maltreatment; harms to human dignity and other
extreme cases.
58
Consequently, in such cases where no tacit consent can be con-
sidered as having been produced, the amparo is admitted even
though the term to file the action would have been exhausted.
Another general exception to the rule of tacit consent refers to
situations where the harms inflicted on the rights are of a contin-
uous nature, that is, when they are continuously occurring. In the
same sense, in the United States, it is considered that "laches"
cannot be alleged as a defense to challenge a suit for an injunction
"to enjoin a wrong which is continuing in its nature."
59
For instance, the Venezuelan courts have ruled regarding a de-
fense argument on the inadmissibility of an amparo action be-
cause the term of six months to file the action had elapsed, that in
the particular case:
58. See the decision of First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action of Oct.
13, 1988, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUrBLICO, n' 36, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
1988, p. 95; decision n0 293 of the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative
Chamber, of Nov. 1, 1989, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n* 40, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1989, p. 111. See also the Cassation Chamber of the same Supreme
Court of Justice, of June 28, 1995, (Exp. n' 94-172), in RAFAEL CHAVERO G., EL NUEVO
REGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at p. 188, note 178,
214 & 246.
59. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 297 (2004) (citing Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sun Valley
Bus Lines, 216 P.2d 404, (Ariz. 1950); Goldstein v. Beal, 59 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1945).
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In spite that the facts show that the challenged actions oc-
curred more that six months ago, they have been described
revealing a supposed chain of events that, due to their con-
stancy and re-incidence, allows to presume that the plaintiff
is presently threatened by those repeated facts. This charac-
ter of the threat is what the amparo intends to stop. Accord-
ing to what the plaintiff points out, no tacit consent can be
produced from his part ... Consequently, there are no grounds
for the application to any of the inadmissibility clauses set
forth in the Amparo Law.
60
In Venezuela, the Amparo Law also provides a few exceptions
regarding the tacit consent rule. When the amparo action is filed
conjointly with another nullity action, the general six-month term
established for the filing of the action does not apply. This is the
rule in cases of harms or threats that have originated in statutes
or regulations, and in administrative acts or public administration
omissions, when the amparo action is filed jointly with the popular
action for judicial review of unconstitutionality of statutes, 61 or
with the judicial review action against administrative actions or
omissions.
62
VI. THE REPARABLE CHARACTER OF THE HARMS AND THE
RESTORATIVE CHARACTER OF THE AMPARO PROCEEDING
As previously mentioned, the injury inflicted upon constitution-
al rights, necessary to file an amparo action can be the result of
harms or threats, which must fulfill the general conditions previ-
ously mentioned. In addition, two other conditions must be ful-
filled by the injury, depending on whether a harm or threat is at
issue. The harm inflicted on a person's rights must be a reparable
60. See Decision of First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action of Oct. 22,
1990, Maria Cambra de Pulgar case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PtBLICO, n° 44, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, pp. 143-44.
61. Regarding the judicial review popular action against statutes, it is conceived in the
Organic Law of the Supreme Tribunal as an action that can be filed at any time. If a peti-
tion for amparo is filed together with the popular action, no delay is applicable. Venez.
Amparo Law, Art. 21. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, LEY ORGANICA DEL TRiBUNAL
SUPREMO DE JUSTIciA, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2006, p. 255. This is why
no tacit consent can be understood when the harm is provoked by a statute.
62. Similarly, the tacit consent rule does not apply either in cases of administrative
acts or omissions, when the amparo action is filed together with the judicial review action
against administrative acts or omissions, in which case, due to the constitutional com-
plaint, the latter can be filed at any moment, as is expressly provided in the Amparo Law.
Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 5.
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one and the amparo proceeding seeks to restore the enjoyment of
that right, thus having a restorative character. If the injury to a
person's rights is caused by a threat, the threat must be immi-
nent. The amparo tends to prevent or impede the violation from
occurring in the case of threats, and has a preventive character.
In cases involving harms, the amparo proceeding seeks to re-
store the enjoyment of the plaintiffs injured right and reestablish
the situation that existed when the right was harmed. This is ac-
complished by eliminating or suspending if necessary, the detri-
mental act or fact. In this regard, the amparo action also has sim-
ilarities with the reparative injunctions in the United States,
which seek to eliminate the effects of a past wrong or to compel
the defendant to engage in a course of action that seeks to correct
those effects.
63
However, in some cases, due to the factual nature of the harm
that has been inflicted, the restorative effect cannot be obtained,
in which case, the amparo decision must place the plaintiffs right
"in the situation closest or more similar to the one that existed
before the injury was caused."
64
Due to the restorative character of the amparo, the specific con-
ditions of the harms must be fulfilled for an amparo petition to be
granted and they must have a reparable character. Consequently,
as is established in the Venezuelan Amparo Law, that amparo
63. As has been explained by Owen M. Fiss:
To see how it works, let us assume that a wrong has occurred (such as an act of dis-
crimination). Then the mission of an injunction -classically conceived as a preventive
instrument- would be to prevent the recurrence of the wrongful conduct in the future
(stop discriminating and do not discriminate again). But in United States v. Louisi-
ana, a voting discrimination case, Justice Black identified still another mission for
the injunction-the elimination of the effects of the past wrong (the past discrimina-
tion). The reparative injunction -long thought by the nineteenth-century textbook
writers, such as High to be an analytical impossibility- was thereby legitimated. And
in the same vein, election officials have been ordered not only to stop discriminating
in the future elections, but also to set aside a past election and to run a new election
as a means of removing the taint of discrimination that infected the first one. Simi-
larly, public housing officials have been ordered to both cease discriminating on the
basis of race in their future choices of sites and to build units in the white areas as a
means of eliminating the effects of the past segregative policy (placing public housing
projects only in the black areas of the city).
Owen M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, 10 (1978) (citing United States v. Louisiana,
380 U.S. 145 (1965); 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115) (internal citations omitted).
64. In this sense, it has been decided by the former Venezuelan Supreme Court of Jus-
tice ruling that "one of the principal characteristics of the amparo action is to be a restora-
tive (restablecedor) judicial means, the mission of which is to restore the infringed situation
or, what is the same, to put the claimant again in the enjoyment of his infringed constitu-
tional rights." See Decision of Feb. 6, 1996, Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Bolivar case;
in CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RIGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note
5, at, 185, 242-43.
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actions are inadmissible, "when the violation of the constitutional
rights and guaranties turns out to be an evident irreparable situa-
tion, and is impossible to restore."65 In these cases, the Amparo
Law defines the irreparable harms as those that, by means of the
amparo action, cannot revert to the status existing before the vio-
lation had occurred. 66
The main consequence of this reparable character of the harm is
the restorative effect of the amparo proceeding, through the am-
paro action, and it is not possible to create new juridical situation
for the plaintiff, nor is it possible to modify the existing legal situ-
ations.67
In this sense, the Venezuelan Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice denied a request formulated by
means of an amparo action for the plaintiff to obtain asylum be-
cause it was seeking to obtain Venezuelan citizenship without ac-
complishing the established administrative conditions and proce-
dures. The Court ruled "this amparo action has been filed in order
to seek a decision from this court, consisting in the legalization of
the situation of the claimant, which would consist in the creation
of a civil and juridical status that the petitioner did not have be-
fore filing the complaint for amparo." Thus the petition was con-
sidered "contrary to the restorative nature of the amparo."68
65. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.3.
66. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.3.
67. See Decisions of the Politico Administrative Chamber of the former Supreme Court
of Justice, n ° 462 of Oct. 27, 1993, Ana Drossos case, and of n0 582 of Nov. 4, 1993, Partido
Convergencia case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PIUBLICO, no 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezo-
lana, Caracas, 1993, pp. 340-42.
68. See Decision dated January 20, 2000, Domingo Ramirez Monja case, in RAFAEL
CHAVERO, EL NUEVO REGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5,
at p. 244. In another decision issued on Apr. 21, 1999, J. C. Marin case, the former Su-
preme Court in a similar sense, declared inadmissible an amparo action in a case in which
the claimant was asking to be appointed as judge in a specific court or to be put in a juridi-
cal situation that he did not have before the challenged act was issued. The Court decided
that in the case, it was impossible for such purpose to file an amparo action, declaring it
inadmissible, thus ruling as follows:
This Court must highlight that one of the essential characteristics of the amparo ac-
tion is its reestablishing effects, that is, literally, to put one thing in the situation it
had beforehand, which for the claimant means to be put in the situation he had be-
fore the production of the claimed violation. The foregoing means that the plaintiffs
claim must be directed to seek 'the reestablishment of the infringed juridical situa-
tion'; since the amparo actions are inadmissible when the reestablishment of the in-
fringed situation is not possible; when through them the claimant seeks a compensa-
tion of damages, because the latter cannot be a substitution of the harmed right; nor
when the plaintiff pretends to the court to create a right or a situation that did not
exist before the challenged act, fact or omission. All this is the exclusion for the pos-
sibility for the amparo to have constitutive effects.
Id. at 244-45.
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Consequently, the restorative effect of the amparo proceeding
imposes the need for the harm to be of a reparable character in
order for the courts to restore things to the status or situation they
had been in at the moment of the injury, enjoining the infringing
fact or act. On the contrary, when the violation of a constitutional
right turns out to be of an irreparable character, the amparo ac-
tion is inadmissible.
This is congruent with the main objective of the amparo pro-
ceeding, which is found in Article 27 of the Venezuelan Constitu-
tion and Article 1 of Amparo Law, in that it seeks to "immediately
restore the infringed situation or to place the claimant in the situ-
ation more similar to it." 69 This is also a general condition for the
admissibility of injunctions in the United States where the courts
have established that because "the purpose of an injunction is to
restrain actions that have not yet been taken", an injunction can-
not be filed to restrain an already completed action at the time the
action is brought.
70
In this same sense, for instance, the former Venezuelan Su-
preme Court declared inadmissible an amparo action against an
illegitimate tax-collecting act after the tax was paid because it was
not possible to restore the infringed situation.71 Regarding wom-
en's pregnancy rights, the Venezuelan courts have declared an
amparo action inadmissible that seeks to protect maternity leave
rights when filed after childbirth, ruling that:
It is impossible for the plaintiff to be restored in her presumed
violated rights to enjoy a maternity leave during six month
before and after the childbirth, because we are now facing an
69. See First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Decision of Jan. 14,
1992, in Revista de Derecho Pdblico, n° 49, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, p.
130; Decision no 162 of the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative
Chamber, of Mar. 4, 1993, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, no 53-54, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, p. 260.
70. As quoted in the C.J.S.:
There is no cause for the issuance of an injunction unless the alleged wrong is actu-
ally occurring or is actually threatened or apprehended with reasonable probability
and a court cannot enjoin an act after it has been completed. An act that has been
completed, such that it no longer presents a justiciable controversy, does not give
grounds for the issuance of an injunction.
43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 55 (2004) (citing Ex parte Connors, 855 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 2003);
Patterson v. Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, 577 A. 2d 701 (Conn. 1990); Kay v. David
Douglas School Dist., 738 P. 2d 1389, (Or. 1987); County of Chesterfield v. Windy Hill, Ltd.,
559 S.E.2d 627 (Va. 2002).
71. See Decision of the former Supreme Court of Justice, of Mar. 21, 1988, in REVISTA
DE DERECHO PliBLICO, n° 34, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1988, p. 114.
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irremediable situation that cannot be restored, due to the fact
that it is impossible to date back the elapsed time.
7 2
In other cases, the same former Venezuelan Supreme Court of
Justice considered amparo actions inadmissible when the only
way to restore the infringed juridical situation was by declaring
the nullity of an administrative act, which the amparo judge can-
not do in his decision.1 3
From these regulations it can be determined that the amparo
proceeding regarding violations is restorative in nature and im-
poses the need for the illegitimate harm to be possibly stopped or
amended in order for the plaintiffs situation to be restored by a
judicial order; or if having continuous effects, for its suspension
when not being initiated. Regarding effects that have already
been accomplished, an amparo action implies the possibility to set
things back to the stage they had been before the harm was initi-
ated. Consequently, the amparo judge cannot create situations
that were nonexistent at the moment of the action's filing; or cor-
rect the harms that have infringed upon rights after it is too late.
74
In this regard, with respect to the right to the protection of
health, the former Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice ruled
that:
The Court considers that the infringed situation is reparable
by means of amparo, due to the fact that the plaintiff can be
satisfied in his claims through such judicial mean. From the
72. See Decision of the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions of
Sept. 7, 1989, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICo, n0 40, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Ca-
racas, 1989, pp. 110-11.
73. See Decision n° 573 of the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative
Chamber of Nov. 1, 1990, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 44, Editorial Juridica Vene-
zolana, Caracas, 1990, pp. 152-153; Cfr. First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, decision of Sept. 10, 1992, Consejo Nacional de Universidades case, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 51, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, p. 155.
74. As decided by the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action of Vene-
zuela, regarding a municipal order for the demolition of a building, in the sense that if the
demolition was already executed, the amparo judge cannot decide the matter because of the
irreparable character of the harm. See the decision of January 1, 1999, B. Gdmez case, in
RAFAEL CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra
note 5, p. 242. The First Court also ruled in a case decided in February 4, 1999, C. Negrin
case, regarding a public university position contest that:
[t]he pretended aggrieved party is seeking to be allowed to be registered himself in
the public contest for the Chair of Pharmacology in the School of Medicine Jos6 Maria
Vargas, but at the present time, the registration was impossible due to the fact that
the delay had elapsed the previous year, and consequently the harm produced must
be considered as irreparable, declaring inadmissible the action for amparo.
Id. at 243.
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judicial procedure point of view, for the protection of health it
is possible for the judge to order the competent authority to
assume precise conduct for the medical treatment of the
claimant's conduct. The petitioner's claim is to have a particu-
lar and adequate health care, which can be obtained via the
amparo action, seeking the reestablishment of a harmed
right. In this case, the claimant is not seeking her health to be
restored to the stage it had before, but to have a particular
health care, which is perfectly valid.75
VII. THE IMMINENT CHARACTER OF THE THREATS AND THE
PREVENTIVE CHARACTER OF THE AMPARO AGAINST THREATS
However, the amparo proceeding is not only a judicial device
that seeks to restore harmed constitutional rights, it is also a judi-
cial means established for the protection of constitutional rights
against illegitimate threats that violate those rights. It is in these
cases that the amparo proceeding has a preventive character by
avoiding harm, similar to the United States' preventive civil rights
injunctions that seek "to prohibit some act or series of acts from
occurring in the future,"76 and designed "to avoid future harm to a
party by prohibiting or mandating certain behavior by another
party."77
It would be absurd for the affected party to have complete
knowledge of the near occurrence of the harm, or to patiently wait
for the harming act to occur in order to file the amparo action. On
the contrary, one has the right to file the action to obtain a judicial
order prohibiting the action from being accomplished, thus avoid-
ing the harm altogether.
The main condition for filing the type of amparo action against
threats (amenaza) to constitutional rights is expressly provided in
the Amparo Law. 78 The threat must be real, certain, immediate,
imminent, possible and realizable.
75. See Decision n 109 of Mar. 8, 1990, Luz M. Serna case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PIBLICO, no 42, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, p. 107.
76. See Fiss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 32, at 7.
77. See TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 22. In Spanish the word "preventive" is used
in procedural law (medidas preventivas o cautelares) to refer to the "temporary" or "prelim-
inary" orders or restraints that in the United States the judge can issue during the proceed-
ing. So the preventive character of the amparo and of the injunctions cannot be confused
with the "medidas preventivas" or temporary or preliminary measures that the courts can
issue during the trial for the immediate protection of rights, facing the prospect of an irre-
mediable harm that can be caused.
78. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 2 & 6.2.
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On the other hand, there are some constitutional rights that
specifically need to be protected against threats, such as the right
to life in cases of imminent death threats, because on the contrary,
they could lose all sense. In this case, the only way to guarantee
the right to life is to avoid materialization of the threats, for in-
stance, by providing the person with effective police protection.
If the main condition for the admissibility of the amparo action
against harms to constitutional rights is their reparable character;
regarding threats, the specific characteristic of the threat at issue
must have an imminent character.
This condition is also expressly established in the Amparo
Law,79 which provides that in order to file an amparo action
against threats, the threats must not only be real, certain, possible
and realizable, but additionally, they must have an immediate and
imminent character, provoking fear in persons or making persons
feel in danger for their rights. On the contrary, "harm" refers to
situations in which a fact has already been accomplished, so no
threat is possible.
Consequently, in order to file an amparo action against a threat,
it must consist of a potential harm or violation that is imminent in
the sense that it may occur soon. This same rule requiring the
imminent character of the threat is applied in the United States,
as an essential condition for granting preventive injunctions. This
means that the courts will order injunctions only when the threat
is imminent and prohibits future conduct, but not when the threat
is considered remote, potential or speculative.
80
79. Id.
80. In Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Circuit Court did
not grant the requested injunction ordering Reserve Mining Company to cease discharging
wastes from its iron ore processing plant in Silver Bay, Minnesota into the ambient air of
Silver Bay and the waters of Lake Superior because even though the plaintiff has estab-
lished that the discharges give "rise to a potential threat to the public health.., no harm to
the public health has been shown to have occurred, that the danger to health is not immi-
nent but that it did call for preventive and precautionary steps; that no reason existed
which required that the company terminate its operations at once ... " 514 F.2d 492 (8th
Cir. 1975); see FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 32, at 116. In another classically cited case,
Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. 688 (1885), which referred to waste deposits in the plaintiffs
land by the defendant, the judge ruled that since the action is brought to prevent continu-
ing damages, for a quia-timet action, two ingredients are necessary:
There must, if no actual damage is proved, be proof of imminent danger, and there
must also be proof that the apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very substantial.
I should almost say it must be proved that it will be irreparable, because, if the dan-
ger is not proved to be so imminent that no one can doubt that if the remedy is de-
layed, the damage will be suffered, I think it must be shown that, if the damage does
occur at any time, it will come in such a way and under such circumstances that it
190 Vol. 49
Spring 2011 The Amparo Proceeding in Venezuela
In the same sense as the amparo, injunctions in the United
States cannot be granted "merely to allay the fears and apprehen-
sions or to soothe the anxieties of individuals, since such fears and
apprehensions may exist without substantial reasons and be abso-
lutely groundless or speculative."81  Injunctions, similar to the
amparo, are extraordinary remedies "designed to prevent serious
harm, and are not to be used to protect a person from mere incon-
venience or speculative and insubstantial injury."8 2
This condition is also generally established in Venezuela, in the
sense that threats that can be protected by the amparo suits must
be imminent,8 3 so the action for amparo is inadmissible when the
threat or violation of a constitutional right has ceased or ended8 4
or when the threat against a constitutional right or guarantee is
not "immediate, possible and feasible.8 5
In the same sense, the former Supreme Court of Justice of Ven-
ezuela in 1989 ruled that:
The opening of a disciplinary administrative inquiry is not
enough to justify the protection of a party by means of the ju-
dicial remedy of amparo, moreover when the said proceeding,
in which all needed defenses can be exercised, may conclude
in a decision discarding the incriminations against the party
will be impossible for the Plaintiff to protect himself against it if relief is denied to
him in a quia timet action.
Fletcher, 28 Ch. 688 (1885); see FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 32, at 110-11.
81. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 40 (2004) (citing Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109
(Ala. 2003); Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norkolk & W. Ry. Co., 748 N. E.2d
153 (Ill. 2001); Frey v. DeCordova Bend Estates Owners Ass'n, 647 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1983).
82. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 40 (2004) (citing Kucera v. State Dep't of Transp., 995
P.2d 63 (Wash. 2002)).
83. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 2
84. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 8.1.
85. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.2. See Decision n* 203 of the former Supreme Court of
Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber of June 9, 1988, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PIIBLICO, no 35, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1988, p. 119, and decision of the
same Chamber no 398 of Aug. 14, 1992, in REVISTA DE DERECHO Pl(JBLICO, n* 51, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, pp. 158-159. See also Decision of the First Court on
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, decision of June 30, 1988, Joao Gomez E. case in
REVISTA DE DERECHO PIIBLICO, no 35, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1988, p. 120.
These general conditions have been considered as concurrent ones when referring to the
constitutional protection against harms that someone will soon be inflicting on the rights of
other. See Decision n' 315 of the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative
Chamber, of May 24, 1993, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PfBLICO, n0 55-56, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, p. 289; and decision of Mar. 22, 1995, La Reintegradora case, in
RAFAEL CHAVERO, EL NUEVO R9GIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra
note 5, p. 239.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 49
with the definitive closing of the disciplinary process, without
any sanction to the party.
8 6
The criteria of the imminent character of the threat to constitu-
tional rights for the admission of the amparo action has also led
the former Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela to reject the
amparo proceeding against statutes, arguing that a statute or a
legal norm, in itself, cannot cause a possible, imminent and feasi-
ble threat.87 Nonetheless, the Court has considered that the
plaintiff can always file the amparo action against the public of-
ficer that applies the statute, and seek a court prohibition directed
to said public officer, compelling him not to apply the challenged
norm.8
8
86. See Decision of the Politico Administrative Chamber of Oct. 26, 1989, Gisela Parra
Mejia case, in RAFAEL CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN
VENEZUELA, supra note 5, pp. 191, 241.
87. In a Decision n' 315 of May 24, 1993, the Politico Administrative Chamber of the
former Supreme Court ruled:
The same occurs with the third condition set forth in the Law; the threat, that is, the
probable and imminent harm, will never be feasible -that is, concreted- by the de-
fendant. If it could be sustained that the amparo could be filed against a disposition
the constitutionality of which is challenged, then it would be necessary to accept as
defendant the legislative body or the public officer that had sanctioned it, being the
latter the one that would act in court defending the act. It can be observed that in
case the possible harm would effectively arrive to be materialized, it would not be the
legislative body or the state organ which issued it, the one that will execute it, but
the public official for whom the application of the norm will be imposing in all the
cases in which an individual would be in the factual situation established in the
norm. If it is understood that the norm can be the object or an amparo action, the
conclusion would be that the defendant (the public entity sanctioning the norm the
unconstitutionality of which is alleged) could not be the one entity conducting the
threat; but that the harm would be in the end concretized or provoked by a different
entity (the one applying to the specific and particular case the unconstitutional provi-
sion).
In REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, n0 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993,
pp. 289-290.
88. In the same decision n' 315 of May 24, 1993, the Politico Administrative Chamber
of the former Supreme Court ruled as referenced supra in footnote 87, the Court ruled as
follows:
Nonetheless, this High Court considers necessary to point out that the previous con-
clusion does not signify the impossibility to prevent the concretion of the harm -
objection that could be drawn from the thesis that the amparo can only proceed if the
unconstitutional norm is applied-, due to the fact that the imminently aggrieved per-
son must not necessarily wait for the effective execution of the illegal norm, because
since he faces the threat having the conditions established in the Law, he could seek
for amparo for his constitutional rights. In such case, though, the amparo would not
be directed against the norm, but against the public officer that has to apply it. In ef-
fect, being imminent the application to an individual of a normative disposition con-
trary to any of the constitutional rights or guaranties, the potentially affected person
could seek from the court a prohibition directed to the said public officer plaintiff,
compelling not to apply the challenged norm, once evaluated by the court as being
unconstitutional.
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VIII. THE INJURING PARTY IN THE AMPARO PROCEEDING
Because the amparo procedure is governed by the principle of
bilateralism, the party that initiates it, that is the plaintiff, whose
constitutional rights and guarantees have been injured or threat-
ened, must always file the action against an injuring party whose
actions or omissions are those that have caused the harm or
threats. This means that the action must always be filed against
a person or a public entity that must also be an individual.8 9 That
is why the amparo proceeding, as well as injunctions in the United
States, have the result of a judicial order "addressed to some clear-
ly identified individual, not just the general citizenry."90
Thus, since the beginning of the proceeding when the amparo
action is filed, or during the procedure, the bilateral character of
the amparo suit implies the need to have a procedural relation
that must be established between the injured party and the injur-
ing one who must also participate in the process. 91
This need for the individualization of the defendant also derives
from the subjective or personal character of the amparo in the
sense that the plaintiffs complaint, as provided in article 18,3 of
the Amparo Law, must clearly identify the authority, public of-
ficer, person or entity against whom the action is filed. In the case
of amparo actions filed against artificial persons, public entities or
corporations, the petition must also identify them with precision
and if possible, also identify their representatives.
Id. at 290.
89. The only exception to the principle of bilateralism is the case of Chile, where the
offender is not considered a defendant party, but is instead considered only a person whose
activity is limited to inform the court and give it the documents it has. That is why in the
regulation set forth by the Supreme Court (Auto Acordado) it is said that the affected state
organ, person or public officer "can" just appear as party in the process. See JUAN MANUEL
ERRAZURIZ G. AND JORGE MIGUEL OTERO A., ASPECTOS PROCESALES DEL RECURSO DE
PROTECCI6N, Editorial Juridica de Chile 1989, p. 27.
90. See FISS, supra note 63, at 12.
91. In this regard, the former Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela in a decision no
649 of Dec.15, 1992, pointed out that:
The amparo action set forth in the Constitution, and regulated in the Organic Am-
paro law, has among its fundamental characteristic its basic personal or subjective
character, which implies that a direct, specific and undutiful relation must exist be-
tween the person claiming for the protection of his rights, and the person purported
to have originated the disturbance, who is to be the one with standing to act as de-
fendant or the person against whom the action is filed. In other words, it is neces-
sary, for granting an amparo, that the person signaled as the injurer be in the end,
the one originating the harm.
Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber, decision dated Dec. 16, 1992,
Haydge Casanova Caso, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, no 52, Editorial Juridica Venezo-
lana, Caracas, 1992, p. 139.
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In these cases of harms caused by entities or corporations, the
action can be filed directly against the natural person acting on its
behalf as representative of the entity or corporation, for instance,
the public official or directly against the entity in itself.92 In this
latter case, according to the expression used in civil right injunc-
tions in the United States, the action is filed against "the office
rather than the person."93
Consequently, in cases of amparo actions filed against entities
or corporations, the natural person representing them can be
changed, as it commonly happens with public entities, 94 a circum-
stance that does not affect the bilateral relation between ag-
grieved and aggrieving parties.
As aforementioned, the action can also be personally filed
against the representative of the entity or corporation itself, for
instance the public officer or the director or manager of the entity,
particularly when the harm or threat has been personally pro-
voked by him, independent of the artificial person or entity for
which he is acting.95
92. This implies that in the filing of the action of amparo in cases of Public Administra-
tion activities, "the person acting on behalf of (or representing) the entity who caused the
harm or threat to the rights or guaranties must be identified, which is, the signaled person
who has the exact and direct knowledge of the facts." Decision of the First Court on Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Actions, dated July 14, 1988, Aurora Figueredo case, in
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 35, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1988, pp.
138-39.
93. See FISS, supra note 63, at 15.
94. As decided by the Venezuelan First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative
Action in a decision of Sept. 28, 1993, Universidad de Los Andes case, regarding an amparo
action filed against the dean of a law faculty, in which case the person in charge as dean
was changed:
The heading of the position does not change its organic unity. If the dean of the Fac-
ulty changes, it will always be a subjective figure that substitutes the previous one.
That is why in a decision of September 11, 1990, this Court ruled that the circum-
stance of the head of an organ mentioned as aggrieving being changed does not alter
the procedural relation originated with the amparo action. In addition, it must be
added that it would have no sense to rule for the procedural relation be continued
with the person that doesn't occupy anymore the position, because in case the consti-
tutional amparo is granted, then the ex public official would not be in a position to
reestablish the factual infringed situation. As much, the former public officer could be
liable for the damages caused, but as it is known, the amparo action has the only
purpose of reestablishing the harmed legal situation, and that can only be assured by
the current public official.
First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a decision of Sept., 28, 1993, See
in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993,
p. 330.
95. In such cases, when the action is filled against public officers, as it is established in
Article 27 of the Venezuelan Amparo Law, the court deciding on the merits must notify its
decision to the competent authority "in order for it to decide the disciplinary sanctions
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In these cases, when, for instance, the public official responsible
for the harm can be identified with precision as the injuring party,
it is only him, personally, who must act as defendant in the proce-
dure, in which case no notice is needed to be sent to his superior or
to the Attorney General. 96 In such cases, it is the individual natu-
ral person or public officer that must personally act as the injuring
party.
97
On the contrary, if the action is filed, for instance, against a
ministerial entity as a public administration organ, in this case
the Attorney General, as representative of the state, is the entity
that must act in the process as its judicial representative. 98 In
other cases, when the amparo action is exercised against a perfect-
ly identified and individuated organ of a public administration
and not against the state, the Attorney General, as its judicial
representative, does not necessarily have a procedural role to
play,99 and cannot act on its behalf.100
One of the most important aspects in the Venezuelan amparo
proceeding regarding the injuring party is that the action for am-
paro can be filed not only against public authorities, but also
against individuals. In other words, this specific judicial means is
conceived for the protection of constitutional rights and guaran-
against the public official responsible for the violation or the threat against a constitutional
right or guaranty." Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 27.
96. See First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, decision of May 12,
1988, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n° 34, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
1988, p. 113; Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber,
decision n' 57 of Mar. 16, 1989, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, n' 38, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1989, p. 110; Venezuelan First Court on Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Action, decision of Sept. 7, 1989, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, n' 40, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1989, p. 107.
97. See former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber, decision n°
109 of Mar. 8, 1990, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 42, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1990, p. 114; Venezuelan First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
decision of Nov. 21, 1990, Comisidn Nacional de Valores case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PUJBLICO, n0 44, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, p. 148.
98. See First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, decision of Sept. 7,
1989, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PIJBLICO, n* 40, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
1989, p. 107.
99. See First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, decision of Nov. 21,
1990, Comisidn Nacional de Valores case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PT3LICO, n' 44, Edito-
rial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, p. 148.
100. See former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative Chamber, decision n°
391 of Aug. 1, 1991, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PfJBLICO, n' 47, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1991, p. 120; First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, decision of
July 30, 1992, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PfiBLICO, n° 51, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1992, p. 164; Former Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrati-
ve Chamber decision n 649 of Dec. 15, 1992, Haydge M. Casanova case, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 52, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, p. 139.
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tees against harms or threats regardless of the actor, which can be
public entities, authorities, individuals or private corporations.
The amparo proceeding was originally created to protect indi-
viduals against the state and that is why some countries like Mex-
ico remain with that traditional trend; but that initial trend has
not prevented the possibility for the admission of the amparo pro-
ceeding for the protection of constitutional rights against other
individual's actions. The current situation is similar in the major-
ity of Latin American countries, the admission of the amparo ac-
tion against individuals is accepted, as is the case in Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru, Venezue-
la and Uruguay, as well as, although in a more restrictive way, in
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Honduras. In this
sense, the writ of amparo is also regulated in the Philippines,
which can be filed against acts or omissions "of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity."10 1 In only a minori-
ty of Latin American countries the amparo action remains exclu-
sively as a protective means against authorities, as happens in
Brazil, El Salvador, Panama, Mexico and Nicaragua. This is also
the case in the United States where the civil rights injunctions, in
matters of constitutional or civil rights or guaranties,10 2 can only
be admitted against public entities.
10 3
In Venezuela, the amparo action is admitted against acts of in-
dividuals. The 1988 Organic Law of Amparo10 4 provides that the
101. Phil. Amparo Law, § 1.
102. In other matters, injunctions can be filed against any person such as "higher public
officials or private persons." ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 16, at 8.
103. As explained by M. Glenn Abernathy and Barbara A. Perry:
Limited remedies for private interference with free choice. Another problem in the
citizen's search for freedom from restriction lies in the fact that many types of inter-
ference stemming from private persons do not constitute actionable wrongs under the
law. Private prejudice and private discrimination do not, in the absence of specific
statutory provisions, offer grounds for judicial intervention in [sic] behalf of the suf-
ferer. If one is denied admission to membership in a social club, for example, solely on
the basis of his race or religion or political affiliation, he may understandably smart
under the rejection, but the courts cannot help him (again assuming no statutory
provision barring such distinctions). There are, then, many types of restraints on in-
dividual freedom of choice which are beyond the authority of courts to remove or ame-
liorate.
It should also be noted that the guarantees of rights in the United States Constitu-
tion only protect against governmental action and do not apply to purely private en-
croachments, except for the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery. Reme-
dies for private invasion must be found in statutes, the common law, or administra-
tive agency regulations and adjudications.
ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 16, at 6.
104. See the reference in RAFAEL CHAVERO G., EL NUEVO R9GIMEN DEL AMPARO
CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, p. 188, note 178, 214 & 246.
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amparo action "shall be admitted against any fact, act or omission
from citizens, legal entities, private groups or organizations that
have violated, violates or threaten to violate any of the constitu-
tional guaranties or rights."10 5
IX. THE INJURING PUBLIC ACTIONS AND OMISSIONS
Being that the amparo action was originally established to de-
fend constitutional rights from state and authority violations, the
most common and important injuring parties in the amparo pro-
ceeding are, of course, the public authorities or public officials
when their acts or omissions, whether of legislative, executive or
judicial nature, cause the harm or threats.
The general principle in this matter in Venezuela, with some
exceptions, is that any authority can be questioned through am-
paro actions, and that any act, fact or omission of any public au-
thority or entity or public official causing an injury to constitu-
tional rights can be challenged by means of such actions. This is
the wording used in the Amparo Law of Venezuela, providing that
the action can be filed against "any fact, act or omission of any of
the National, State, or Municipal branches of government" (Po-
deres Piiblicos);10 6 which means that the constitutional protection
can be filed against any public action, that is, any formal state act,
any substantive or any factual activity (via de hecho);10 7 as well as
against any omission from public entities. That is also why the
courts in Venezuela have decided that "there is no State act that
can be excluded from revision by means of amparo, the purpose of
which is not to annul State acts but to protect public freedoms and
restore its enjoyment when violated or harmed," thereby admit-
ting that the constitutional amparo action can be filed even
against legislative acts excluded from judicial review, when a
harm or violation of constitutional rights or guarantees has been
alleged.108
105. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 2.
106. Id.
107. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 5.
108. See the former Supreme Court of Justice decision n° 22 dated Jan. 31, 1991, Ansel-
mo Natale case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 45, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1991, p. 118. See also Decision of the First Court on Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Action of June 18, 1992, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n* 46, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1991, p. 125. The universal character of the amparo regarding public
authorities, acts or omissions, according to the Venezuelan courts, implies that:
From what Article 2 of the Amparo law sets forth, it results that no type of conduct,
regardless of its nature or character or their authors, can per se be excluded from the
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In particular, regarding the possibility to file amparo actions
against legislative actions or omissions when they cause harms on
constitutional rights of individuals, a distinction can be made be-
tween when the harm or threats are caused by statutes or by oth-
er decisions adopted, for instance, by parliamentary commissions.
Regarding congressional and parliamentary commissions' acts,
including regional or municipal legislative councils, 10 9 when they
harm constitutional rights and guarantees, in principle, it is pos-
amparo judge revision in order to determine if it harms or doesn't harm constitution-
al rights or guaranties.
Decision of the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action of Nov. 11, 1993,
Aura Loreto Rangel case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, no 55-56, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, p. 284. The same criterion was adopted by the Political Admin-
istrative Chamber of the former Supreme Court of Justice in a Decision n' 315 of May 24,
1993, as follows:
The terms on which the amparo action is regulated in Article 49 of the Constitution
(now Article 27) are very extensive. If the extended scope of the rights and guaranties
that can be protected and restored through this judicial mean is undoubted; the harm
cannot be limited to those produced only by some acts. So, in equal terms it must be
permitted that any harming act-whether an act, a fact or an omission-with respect
to any constitutional right and guaranty, can be challenged by means of this action,
due to the fact that the amparo action is the protection of any norm regulating the so-
called subjective rights of constitutional rank, it cannot be sustained that such pro-
tection is only available in cases in which the injuring act has some precise character-
istics, whether from a material or organic point of view. The jurisprudencia of this
Court has been constant regarding both principles. In a decision n' 22, dated Janu-
ary 31, 1991, Anselmo Natale case, it was decided that "there is no State act that
could not be reviewed by amparo, the latter understood not as a mean for judicial re-
view of constitutionality of State acts in order to annul them, but as a protective rem-
edy regarding public freedoms whose purpose is to reestablish its enjoyment and ex-
ercise, when a natural or artificial person, or group or private organization, threatens
to harm them or effectively harm them.
(See regarding the extended scope of the protected rights, Decision of Dec. 4, 1990, Mariela
Morales de Jimenez case, n0 661); See in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n* 55-56, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp. 284-85. See on the Mariela Morales de Jimdnez
case in REVISTA DE DERECHO PPBLICO, n* 45, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1991,
p. 115 In another decision dated February 13, 1992, the First Court ruled:
This Court observes that the essential characteristic of the amparo regime, in its con-
stitutional regulation as well as in its statutory development, is its universality.., [if
this is a proper omission, the ellipses should be . . . BB rule 5.3, page 78] so the pro-
tection it assures is extended to all subjects (physical or artificial persons), as well as
regarding all constitutionally guaranteed rights, including those that without being
expressly regulated in the Constitution are inherent to human beings. This is the de-
parting point in order to understand the scope of the constitutional amparo. Regard-
ing Public Administration, the amparo against it is so extended that it can be filed
against all acts, omissions and factual actions, without any kind of exclusion regard-
ing some matters that are always related to the public order and social interest. [BB
rule 5.1, page 76]
See in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 49, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992,
pp. 120-21.
109. In the United States, municipal council acts can be challenged through injunctions.
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 317 n.3 (1958). See ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note
16, at 12-13.
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sible to challenge them through amparo actions before the compe-
tent courts. 110 In contrast, in the United States, the general rule
is that injunctions may not be directed against Congress so injunc-
tions have been rejected, for instance, when seeking to suspend a
congressional subpoena, regarding which the plaintiff had an ade-
quate remedy to protect his rights."'
Regarding statutes, although in the majority of Latin American
countries the amparo action against them is rejected, in Venezue-
la, it is expressly accepted, but only regarding self-executing stat-
utes that can harm the constitutional rights without the need for
any other state act executing or applying them, or only regarding
the acts applying the particular statute. In effect, in Venezuela,
due to the universal character of the system for constitutional pro-
tection, which eventually was consolidated in the 1999 Constitu-
tion, one of the most distinguishable innovations of the 1988 Am-
paro Law was to establish the amparo action against statutes and
other normative acts, complementing the general mixed system of
judicial review. 1 2 When filed directly against statutes, the pur-
pose of the Amparo Law's provision was to secure the inapplicabil-
110. In Venezuela, the Supreme Court, even recognizing the existence of exclusive at-
tributions of legislative bodies, which according to the 1961 Constitution (Article 159) were
not subjected to judicial review, admitted the amparo protection against them for the im-
mediate restoration of the plaintiffs harmed constitutional rights. It admitted the amparo
action against legislative acts, in a decision n0 22 dated January 31, 1991 in Anselmo Na-
tale, ruling as follows:
The exclusion of judicial review regarding certain parliamentary acts-except in cas-
es of extra limitation of powers-set forth in Article 159 of the Constitution, as a way
to prevent, due to the rules of separation of powers, that the executive and judicial
branches could invade or interfere in the orbit of the legislative body which is the
trustee of the popular sovereignty, is restricted to determine the intrinsic regularity
of such acts regarding the Constitution, in order to annul them, but it does not apply
when it is a matter of obtaining the immediate reestablishment of the enjoyment and
exercise of harmed rights and guaranties set forth in the Constitution.
Anselmo Natale case. See in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 45, Editorial Juridica Vene-
zolana, Caracas, 1991, p. 118.
111. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 202 (2004) (citing Mins v. McCarthy, 209 F.2d 307, 307
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (per curiam)).
112. According to Article 3 of the Amparo Law, two ways are established through which
an amparo pretension can be filed before the competent court: (1) in an autonomous way,
or (2) exercised together with the popular action of unconstitutionality of statutes. Venez.
Amparo Law, Art. 3. In the latter case, the amparo pretension is subordinated to the prin-
cipal action for judicial review, producing only the possibility for the court to suspend the
application of the statute pending the unconstitutionality suit. See BREWER-CARtAS,
INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCI)N DE
AMPARO, supra note 5, at 227. In this case, the situation is similar to the one of the popu-
lar action of unconstitutionality in the Dominican Republic when the amparo pretension is
filed together with it. See EDUARDO JORGE PRATS, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, Vol. II,
Gaceta Judicial, Santo Domingo, 2005, p. 399.
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ity of the statute to the particular case, with inter partes effects. 113
Yet in spite of the Amparo Law provisions, the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Tribunal rejected such actions, imposing the need to
file them only against the state acts issued to apply the statutes
and not directly against the statutes themselves. 1" 4 The Court, in
its decisions, even though admitting the distinction between the
self-executing and not self-executing statutes,"15 concluded its rul-
ing by declaring the impossibility for a real normative act to di-
rectly and by itself harm the constitutional rights of an individual.
The Court also considered that a statute cannot be a threat to con-
stitutional rights, because for an amparo to be filed, a threat must
be "imminent, possible and realizable," considering that in the case
of statutes such conditions are not fulled."
16
113. See BREWER-CARtAS, INSTITUCIONES POLUTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL
DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 224; CHAVERO, EL NUEVO R9GIMEN DEL
AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at 553 ff.
114. The Politico Administrative Chamber of the former Supreme Court issued a deci-
sion n0 315 dated May 24, 1993, that has been the leading case on the matter, ruling that:
[Tihus, it seem that there is no doubt that Article 3 of the Amparo law does not set
forth the possibility of filing an amparo action directly against a normative act, but
against the act, fact or omission that has its origin in a normative provision which is
considered by the claimant as contrary to the Constitution and for which, due to the
presumption of legitimacy and constitutionality of the former, the court must previ-
ously resolve its inapplicability to the concrete case argued. It is obvious, thus, that
such article of the Amparo law does not allow the possibility of filing this action for
constitutional protection against a statute or other normative act, but against the act
which applies or executes it, which is definitively the one that in the concrete case
can cause a particular harm to the constitutional rights and guaranties of a precise
person.
REVISTA DE DERECHO P13BLICO, n0 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp.
287-88.
115. Ruling that the self-executing statutes impose an immediate obligation for the
person to whom it is issued, with its promulgation, and, on the contrary, those statutes not
self-executing require an act for its execution, in which case its sole promulgation cannot
produce a constitutional violation. See decision n ° 315 of the Politico Administrative
Chamber of the former Supreme Court of Justice, of May 24, 1993, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PfBLICO, n° 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp. 285-86.
116. The Court, in the same decision n ° 315 dated May 24, 1993, rejected the possibility
of a threat caused by a statute, with the following argument:
In case of an amparo action against a norm, the concretion of the possible harm
would not be 'immediate', because it will always be the need for a competent authori-
ty to execute or apply it in order for the statute to effectively harm the claimant. It
must be concluded that the probable harm produced by the norm will always be a
mediate and indirect one, due to the need for the statute to be applied to the particu-
lar case. So that the harm will be caused by mean of the act applying the illegal
norm. The same occurs with the third condition, in the sense that the probable and
imminent threat will never be made by the possible defendant. If it would be possible
to sustain that the amparo could be admissible against a statute whose constitution-
ality is challenged, it would be necessary to accept as aggrieved party the legislative
body issuing it, being the party to participate in the process as defendant. But it must
be highlighted that in the case in which the possible harm could be realized, it would
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Regarding executive authorities, the general principle is that
the action is admitted against acts, facts or omissions from public
entities or bodies conforming to the public administration at all its
levels (national, state, municipal), including decentralized, auton-
omous, independent bodies and including acts issued by the Head
of the Executive, that is, the President of the Republic. This last
aspect, for instance, is contrary to the rule regarding injunctions
in the United States where the principle is that such a coercive
remedy "may not be directed against the President."
117
Regarding administrative acts, as mentioned, the Amparo Law
admits the filing of amparo actions against them, providing for
possibility of exercising the amparo action in two ways: in an au-
tonomous way or conjunctly with nullity recourse for judicial re-
view of the administrative act. 118 The main distinction between
both means'1 9 lies, first, in the character of the allegation. In the
not be the legislative body the one called to execute it, but rather the public officer
that must apply the norm in all the cases in which an individual is located in the sit-
uation it regulates. If it is understood that the object of the amparo action is the stat-
ute, then the conclusion would be that the possible defendant (the public entity enact-
ing the norm whose unconstitutionality is alleged) could not be the one that could
make the threat. The concrete harm would be definitively made by a different entity
or person (the one applying the unconstitutional norm to a specific and particular
case).
REVISTA DE DERECHO PTUBLICO, n° 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp.
288, 290. From the abovementioned, the Venezuelan Supreme Court's conclusion rejected
the amparo action against statutes and normative acts, not only because it considered that
the Amparo Laws do not set forth such possibilities -bypassing its text- but because even
being possible to bring the extraordinary action against a normative act, it would not com-
ply with the imminent, possible and realizable conditions of the threats set forth in Article
6.2 of the Amparo Law. See the comments in Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La accidn de amparo
contra leyes y demds actos normativos en el derecho venezolano, in LIBER AMICORUM.
HItCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO, Vol. I, Secretaria de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.
San Jos6, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 481-501.
117. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 201 (2004) (citing Sloan v. Nixon, 60 F.R.D. 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd 493 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1974), affd 419 U.S. 958 (1974)).
118. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 5. Regarding the latter, the former Supreme Court of
Justice in the decision n° 343 of July 10, 1991, Tarjetas Banvenez case, clarified that in such
case, the action is not a principal one, but subordinated and ancillary regarding the princi-
pal recourse to which it has been attached, and subjected to the final nullifying decision
that has to be issued in it. See in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 47, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1991, pp. 169-74. That is why, in such cases, the amparo pretension
that must be founded in a grave presumption of the violation of the constitutional right has
a preventive and temporal character, pending the final decision of the nullity suit, consist-
ing of the suspension of the effects of the challenged administrative act. This provisional
character of the amparo protection pending the suit is thus subjected to the final decision to
be issued in the nullity judicial review procedure against the challenged administrative act.
See the same decision n' 343 of July 10, 1991, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PIUBLICO, n° 47,
Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1991, pp. 170-71.
119. The main difference between both procedures according to the Supreme Court doc-
trine is that in the first case of the autonomous amparo action against administrative acts,
the plaintiff must allege a direct, immediate and flagrant violation to the constitutional
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first case, the alleged and proved constitutional right violation
must be a direct, immediate and flagrant one. In the second case,
what has to be proved is the existence of a grave presumption of
the constitutional right violation. The distinction next lies in the
general purpose of the proceeding. In the first case, the judicial
decision issued is a definitive constitutional protection of restora-
tive character. In the second case, it has only a preliminary char-
acter of suspension of the effects of the challenged act pending the
decision of the principal judicial review process.
120
Contrary to what happens in the majority of Latin American
countries, in Venezuela, the amparo action is admitted against
judicial acts, except decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Jus-
tice. 121 Article 4 of the Amparo Law provides that in the cases of
judicial decisions "the action for amparo shall also be admitted
when a court, acting outside its competence, issues a resolution or
decision, or orders an action that impairs a constitutional right."12
2
Considering that no court has any power to unlawfully cause
harm to constitutional rights or guarantees, the amparo against
judicial decisions is extensively admitted when a court decision
directly harms the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, normally
related to the due process of law rights.1 23 In a certain way re-
right, which in its own demonstrates the need for the amparo order as a definitive means to
restore the harmed juridical situation. In the second case, given the suspensive nature of
the amparo order which only tends to provisionally stop the effects of the injuring act until
the judicial review of administrative action confirming or nullifying it is decided, the al-
leged unconstitutional violations of constitutional provisions can be formulated together
with violations of legal or statutory provisions developing the constitutional ones, because
it is a judicial review action against administrative acts, seeking their nullity, they can also
be founded on legal texts. What the court cannot do in cases of filing the actions together,
in order to suspend the effects of the challenged administrative act, is to base its decision
only in the legal violations alleged, because that would mean to anticipate the final decision
on the principal nullity judicial review recourse. See the former Supreme Court of Justice in
the decision n* 343 of July 10, 1991, Tarjetas Banvenez case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PPBLICO, n? 47, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1991, pp. 171- 7 2 .
120. Id. at 172. See also, regarding the nullity of Article 22 of the Organic Amparo. Law,
the former Supreme Court of Justice decision n' 644 dated May 21, 1996, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO P()BLICO, n' 65-66, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1996, pp.3 3 2 ff. See
the comments in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, INSTITUCIONES POLTICAS Y
CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMo V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 392 ff.
121. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.6.
122. Venez.Amparo Law, Art. 4.
123. As was decided by the Cassation Chamber of the former Supreme Court of Justice
in a decision from Dec. 5, 1990, the amparo against judicial decisions is admitted,
when the decision in itself injures the juridical conscience, when harming in a fla-
grant way individual rights that cannot be renounced or when the decision violates
the principle of juridical security (judicial stability), deciding against res judicata, or
when issued in a process where the plaintiffs right to defense has not been guaran-
teed, or in any way the due process guaranty has been violated.
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garding injunctions on judicial matters, it can also be said that in
the United States, injunctions can also be granted when, for in-
stance, it clearly appears that the prosecution of law actions are
the result of fraud, gross wrong or oppression, in which cases jus-
tice clearly requires equitable interference.
124
On the other hand, although in many countries the amparo pro-
ceedings cannot be the object of another amparo action, in a way
similar to the rule established in the United States regarding an
injunction against another injunction, sometimes referred to as a
"counter injunction," which cannot be admitted, 125 in Venezuela
the amparo actions are admitted even against previous amparo
judicial decisions. 126 Considering that such decisions can also, by
themselves, violate constitutional rights of the plaintiff or of the
defendant, different to those claimed in the initial amparo action,
such an admission of the amparo action is necessary.
Beside the legislative, executive and judicial branches of gov-
ernment, the amparo action can also be filed against the acts of
other independent organs or branches of government like, for in-
stance, the electoral bodies in charge of governing the electoral
processes, the People's Defendant Office, the Public Prosecutor
Office of the General Comptroller Office, including the judiciary
organs in charge of the government and administration of courts
and tribunals. Because those entities are state organs, in princi-
Case Josg Diaz Aquino, also referred to in decision dated Dec. 14, 1994, of the same Cassa-
tion Chamber. See the reference in BREWER-CARtAS, INSTITUCIONES POLTICAS Y
CONSTITUCIONALES, ToMo V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACcI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 261;
and CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note
5, at 483 ff. See also Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El problema del amparo contra sentencias o de
cdmo la Sala de Casacidn Civil remedia arbitrariedades judiciales, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
P(TBLICO, n- 34, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1988, pp. 157-71.
124. As has been decided by the courts:
The power of a court of equity to interfere with the general right of a person to sue
and to restrain the person from prosecuting the action will be exercised only where it
appears clearly that the prosecution of the law action will result in a fraud, gross
wrong, or oppression, and that conscience and justice clearly require equitable inter-
ference. Accordingly, an action at law may be restrained under these restrictive rules
where a person is attempting to, or would, through the instrumentality of an action
at law, obtain an unconscionable advantage of another.
43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 96 (2004) (citing Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R Co. 315 U.S. 698
(1942)); see also Kardy v. Shook, 207 A.2d 83 (Md. 1965); Langenau Mfg. Co. v. City of
Cleveland, 112 N.E.2d 658 (Ohio 1953).
125. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 69 (2004) (citing Sellers v. Valenzuela, 32 So.2d 520 (Ala.
1947)).
126. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARAS, INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES,
TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 263; and El recurso de am-
paro contra sentencias de amparo dictadas en segunda instancia, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PUBLICO, N0 36, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1988, pp. 160-72.
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ple their acts, facts and omissions can also be challenged by means
of amparo actions when violating constitutional rights.
Apart from the positive acts or actions from public officers, au-
thorities or from individuals, that amparo action can also be filed
against the omissions of authorities when the corresponding enti-
ties or public officials fail to comply with their general obligations,
thereby causing harm or threat to constitutional rights. In the
cases of public officers' omissions, the amparo action is generally
filed in order to obtain from the court an order directed against
the public officer compelling him to act in a matter with respect to
which he has the authority or jurisdiction. In these cases, the ef-
fect of the amparo decision regarding omissions is similar to the
United States mandamus or mandatory injunction, 127 which con-
sists in "a writ commanding a public officer to perform some duty
which the laws require him to do but he refuses or neglects to per-
form."
128
In any case, for an omission to be the object of an amparo action,
it must also inflict a direct harm to the constitutional right of the
plaintiff. If the violation is only referring to a right of legal rank,
the amparo action is inadmissible and the affected party is obliged
to use the ordinary judicial remedies, like the judicial review of
administrative omission action to be filed before the special courts
of the matter (contencioso-administrativo).29 In order to deter-
127. In the United States, "[w]hile as a general rule courts will not compel by injunction
the performance by public officers of their official duties, a court may compel public officers
or boards to act in a matter with respect to which they have jurisdiction or authority[.]"
43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 194 (2004) (citing Erie v. State Highway Comm'n, 461 P.2d 207
(Mont. 1969); Bellamy v. Gates, 200 S.E.2d 533, (Va. 1973)).
128. See ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 16, at 8. The consequence of this rule is that
mandamus cannot be used if the public officer has any discretion in the matter; "but if the
law is clear in requiring the performance of some ministerial (nondiscretionary) function,
then mandamus may properly be sought to nudge the reluctant or negligent official along
in the performance of his or her duties." As it was decided by the United States Supreme
Court in Wilbur v. U. S. ex. rel. Kadrie:
Where the duty in a particular situation is so plainly prescribed as to be free from
doubt and equivalent to a positive command, it is regarded as being so far ministerial
that its performance may be compelled by mandamus, unless there be provision or
implication to the contrary. But where the duty is not thus plainly prescribed, but
depends upon a statute or statutes the construction or application of which is not free
from doubt, it is regarded as involving the character of judgment or discretion which
cannot be controlled by mandamus.
281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930) (footnote omitted). See the references in ABERNATHY & PERRY,
supra note 16, at 8.
129. According to the judicial doctrine established by the former Supreme Court of Jus-
tice of Venezuela, the amparo action against omissions by the Public Administration, must
comply with the following two conditions:
a) That the alleged omissive conduct be absolute, which means that Public Admin-
istration has not accomplished in any moment the due function; and b) that the omis-
204 Vol. 49
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mine when it is possible to file an amparo action against public
officers' omissions, the key element established by the Venezuelan
courts refers to the nature of the public officers' duties, because
the amparo action is only admissible when the matters refer to a
generic constitutional duty and not to specific legal ones.
130
Because the judicial order of mandamus in the amparo decision
regarding public authorities' omissions is a command directed to
the public officer to perform the duty that the constitution re-
quires him to do, which he has refused or neglected to perform,
1' 1
the general rule is that the court order cannot substitute the pub-
lic officer's power to decide. Only in cases when a specific statute
provides what it is called a "positive silence" (the presumption
that after the exhaustion of a particular term, it is considered that
sion be regarding a generic duty, that is, the duty a public officer has to act in com-
pliance with the powers attributed to him, which is different to the specific duty that
is the condition for the judicial review of administrative omissive action. Thus, only
when it is a matter of a generic duty, of procedure, of providing in a matter which is
inherent to the public officer position, he incurs in the omissive conduct regarding
which the amparo action is admissible.
See the Decision n' 541 of the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative
Chamber, dated Nov. 5, 1992, Jorge E. Alvarado case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PtBLICO, no
52, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1992, p. 187; and decision n' 766 Nov.18, 1993,
in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, n' 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993,
p. 295.
130. As defined by the same former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative
Chamber, in a decision n' 69 dated February 11, 1992:
In cases of Public Administration abstentions or omissions, a distinction can be ob-
served regarding the constitutional provisions violated when they provide for generic
or specific duties. In the first case, when a public entity does not comply with its ge-
neric obligation to answer [a petition] filed by an individual, it violates the constitu-
tional right to obtain prompt answer [to his petition] as set forth in Article 67 of the
Constitution; whereas when the inactivity is produced regarding a specific duty im-
posed by a statute in a concrete and ineludible way, no direct constitutional violation
occurs, in which case the Court has imposed the filing of the judicial review of admin-
istrative omissions recourse ..... From the aforementioned reasons the Court deems
conclusive that the inactivity of Public Administration to accomplish a specific legal
duty precisely infringes in a direct and immediate way the legal (statutory) text regu-
lating the matter, in which case the Constitution is only violated in a mediate and
indirect way. For the amparo judge, in order to detect if an abstention of the ag-
grieved entity effectively harms a constitutional right or guaranty, it must first, rely
himself on the supposedly unaccomplished statute in order to verify if the abstention
is regarding a specific obligation; in which case it must deny the amparo action, hav-
ing the plaintiff the possibility to file another remedy, like the judicial review action
against Public Administration omissions.
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 53-54, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp.
272-73.
131. For instance, to promptly issue the corresponding decision accordingly to the formal
petition filed before the authority. VENEZ. CONsT. ART. 51 (1999). See the First Court on
Judicial Review of Administrative Actions decision dated Aug. 26, 1993, Klanki case, in
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 55-56, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, p.
294.
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public administration has tacitly decided accordingly to what has
been asked in the particular petition) the judicial order is consid-
ered as implicitly giving positive effects to the official abstention
or omission. 132
X. THE ADMISSIBILITY CONDITIONS OF THE AMPARO ACTION
BASED ON ITS EXTRAORDINARY CHARACTER
Since the amparo action is a judicial means specifically estab-
lished for the protection of constitutional rights, it is conceived in
Venezuela as an extraordinary judicial instrument that, conse-
quently, does not substitute for all the other ordinary judicial
remedies established for the protection of personal rights and in-
terests. This implies that the amparo action, as a matter of prin-
ciple, only can be filed when no other adequate judicial mean ex-
ists and is available in order to obtain the immediate protection of
the violated constitutional rights. This implies the need for the
courts to, determine the existence or nonexistence of other ade-
quate judicial means for the immediate protection of the rights,
which justifies or not the use of the extraordinary action.
This question of the adjective rules of the admissibility of the
amparo action derives from the relation that exists between the
amparo action as an extraordinary judicial means, and the other
ordinary judicial means. In this context, the general rule of ad-
missibility refers to two aspects: first, that the amparo action can
only be admissible when there are no other judicial means for
granting the constitutional protection; and second, that when the
legal order provides for these other judicial means for protection of
the right, they are inadequate in order to obtain the immediate
protection of the harmed or threatened constitutional rights. In a
contrary sense, the amparo action is inadmissible for the protec-
tion of a constitutional right if the legal order provides for other
actions or proceedings that are adequate for such purpose, guar-
anteeing immediate protection to the right.
This rule of admissibility of the amparo action is similar to the
general rule existing in the United States regarding injunctions
and all other equitable remedies, "like mandamus and prohibi-
tions, is reserved for extraordinary cases", 133 in the sense that they
132. See the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions decision dated
Dec. 20, 1991, BHO, C.A. case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 48, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1991, pp. 141-43.
133. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 2 (2004) (citing Ex-parte Collet, 337 U.S. 55, (1949)).
This main characteristic of the injunction as an extraordinary remedy has been established
Vol. 49206
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are "available only after the applicant shows that the legal reme-
dies are inadequate."' 134 It is a traditional and fundamental prin-
ciple for granting an injunction that the "inadequacy of the exist-
ing legal remedies" must be established. 35 This condition of the
"availability" or of the "sufficiency" 136 has also been referred to as
the rule of "irreparable injury," meaning that the injunction is on-
ly admissible when the "harm cannot be repaired by the remedies
available in the common law courts." That is, if the threatened
rights are rectified by a legal remedy, then the judge will refuse to
grant the injunction.137
This rule always imposes the need for the plaintiff and for the
court to determine in each case, not only the existence and availa-
bility of ordinary judicial means for obtaining the constitutional
protection, but also the adequacy of such existing and available
since the nineteenth century in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), in which case, in the words
of Justice Brewer, who delivered the opinion of the court, it was decided that: "As a rule,
injunctions are denied to those who have adequate remedy at law. Where the choice is
between the ordinary and the extraordinary processes of law, and the former are sufficient,
the rule will not permit the use of the latter." Debs, 158 U.S. at 583. See FISS &
RENDLEMAN, supra note 32.
134. FIss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 32, at 59.
135. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 71 (2004) (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1958)). The judicial doctrine on the matter has been summarized as follows:
[A]n injunction, like any other equitable remedy, will only issue [sic] where there is
no adequate remedy at law. Accordingly, except where the rule is changed by statute,
an injunction ordinarily will not be granted where there is an adequate remedy at
law for the injury complained of, which is full and complete. Conversely, a court of
equitable jurisdiction may grant an injunction where an adequate and complete rem-
edy cannot be had in the courts of law, despite the petitioner's best efforts. Moreover,
a court will not deny access to injunctive relief when local procedures cannot effec-
tively, conveniently and directly determine whether the petitioner is entitled to the
relief claimed.
Id.
136. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 100 (2004).
137. See FIss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 32, at 59. This situation, as pointed out by
Owen M. Fiss,
[M]akes the issuance of an injunction conditional upon a showing that the plaintiff
has no alternative remedy that will adequately repair his injury. Operationally this
means that as general proposition the plaintiff is remitted to some remedy other than
an injunction unless he can show that his noninjunctive remedies are inadequate.
FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 32. This term "inadequacy," according to Tabb and Shoben,
"has a specific meaning in the law of equity because it is a shorthand expression for the
policy that equitable remedies are subordinate to legal ones. They are subordinate in the
sense that the damage remedy is preferred in any individual case if it is adequate." TABB &
SHOBEN, supra note 47, at 15. In particular, regarding constitutional claims involving
constitutional rights such as those for school desegregation, it has been considered that
their protection precisely requires the extraordinary remedy that can be obtained by equi-
table intervention, as was decided by the Supreme Court regarding school desegregation in
its second opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 753 (1955) and regarding the
unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment in the prison system in Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978). TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 25-26.
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recourses for granting the immediate constitutional protection to
the constitutional right. In this sense, in Venezuela, without an
express provision in the Amparo Law, the Supreme Court has
ruled that "the amparo is admissible even in cases where, alt-
hough ordinary means exist for the protection of the infringed ju-
ridical situation, they would not be suitable, adequate or effective
for the immediate restoration of the said situation."138 Also, the
question of the adjective consequences resulting from the plain-
tiffs previous election of other remedies for the claimed protection
filed before the amparo action must also be analyzed.
Of course, this question of the availability and of the adequacy
of the existing judicial means for the admissibility or inadmissibil-
ity of the amparo action eventually is a matter of judicial interpre-
tation and adjudication, which must always be decided in the par-
ticular case decision, when evaluating the adequacy question.
139
138. Decision no 109 of the former Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela of Mar. 8,
1990, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, no 42, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
1990, pp. 107-08. In a similar sense, the Supreme Court in a decision n° 705 dated Dec.
11, 1990, ruled that:
The criteria of this High Court as well as the authors' opinions has been reiterative in
the sense that the amparo action is an extraordinary or special judicial remedy that
is only admissible when the other procedural means that could repair the harm are
exhausted, do not exist or would be inoperative. Additionally, Article 5 of the Amparo
Law provides that the amparo action is only admissible when no brief, summary and
effective procedural means exist in accordance with the constitutional protection.
This objective procedural condition for the admissibility of the action turns the am-
paro into a judicial mean that can only be admissible by the court once it has verified
that the other ordinary means are not effective or adequate in order to restore the in-
fringed juridical situation. If other means exist, the court must not admit the pro-
posed amparo action.
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 45, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1991, p. 112.
The Supreme Court, in another decision no 270 dated June 12, 1990, decided that the am-
paro action is admissible:
when there are no other means for the adequate and effective reestablishment of the
infringed juridical situation. Consequently, one of the conditions for the admissibility
of the amparo action is the nonexistence of other more effective means for the
reestablishment of the harmed rights. If such means are adequate to resolve the sit-
uation, there is no need to file the special amparo action. But even if such means ex-
ists, if they are inadequate for the immediate reestablishment of the constitutional
guaranty, it is also justifiable to use the constitutional protection mean of amparo.
See decision no 270 of the Politico Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice
of June 12, 1990, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO no 43, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1990, p. 78. See also decision no 656 of the Politico Administrative Chamber of the
Supreme Court of Justice of Dec. 2, 1993, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, no 55-56, Edi-
torial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp. 311-13.
139. For instance, in a decision of the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative
Actions dated May 20, 1994 (Federaci6n Venezolana de Deportes Equestres case), it was
ruled that the judicial review of administrative acts were not adequate for the protection
requested in the case, seeking the participation of the Venezuelan Federation of Equestrian
Sports in an international competition, being the opinion of the courts:
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In Venezuela, particularly regarding the amparo action against
administrative acts, the prevalent doctrine on the matter for many
years, established by the former Supreme Court of Justice, was to
admit the amparo action in spite of the existence of the specific
recourse before the Judicial Review of Administrative Action Ju-
risdiction. Yet this wide protective doctrine has been unfortunate-
ly abandoned in recent years by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice,
applying a restrictive interpretation regarding the adequacy of the
judicial review action for the annulment of administrative acts,
and rejecting the amparo action when filed directly against
them. 140
Mhat when the action was brought before it, the only mean that the claimant had in
order to obtain the reestablishment of the infringed juridical situation was the am-
paro action, due to the fact that by means of the judicial review of administrative acts
recourse seeking its nullity, they could never be able to obtain the said reestablish-
ment of the infringed juridical situation that was to assist to the 1990 international
contest.
See in REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO, n0 57-58, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
1994, pp. 284 ff..; and in CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN
VENEZUELA, supra, note 5, at 354.
140. This can be realized from the decision taken in a recent and polemic case referring
to the expropriation of some premises of a corn agro-industry complex, which developed as
follows: in Aug. 2005, officers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Land and military
officers and soldiers from the Army and the National Guard surrounded the installation of
the company Refinadora de Maiz Venezolana, C.A. (Remavenca), and announcements were
publicly made regarding the appointment of an Administrator Commission that would be
taking over the industry. These actions were challenged by the company as a de facto ac-
tion alleging the violation of the company's rights to equality, due process and defense,
economic freedom, property rights and to the non-confiscation guarantee of property. A few
days later, the Governor of the State of Barinas, where the industry was located, issued a
decree ordering the expropriation of the premises, and consequently the Supreme Tribunal
declared the inadmissibility of the amparo action that was filed, basing its ruling on the
following arguments:
The criteria established up to now by this Tribunal, by which it has concluded on the
inadmissibility of the autonomous amparo action against administrative acts has
been that the judicial review of administrative act actions -among which the recourse
for nullity, the actions against the administrative abstentions and recourse filed by
public servants- are the adequate means, that is, the brief, prompt and efficient
means in order to obtain the reestablishment of the infringed juridical situation, in
addition to the wide powers that are attributed to the administrative jurisdiction
courts in Article 29 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the recourse for nullity or the
expropriation suit are the adequate means to resolve the claims referring to supposed
controversies in the expropriation procedure; those are the preexisting judicial means
in order to judicially decide conflicts in which previous legality studies are required,
and which the constitutional judge cannot consider. Thus, the Chamber considers
that the claimants, if they think that the alleged claim persists, can obtain the
reestablishment of their allegedly infringed juridical situation, by means of the ordi-
nary actions and to obtain satisfaction to their claims. So because of the existing ade-
quate means for the resolution of the controversy argued by the plaintiff, it is com-
pulsory for the Chamber to declare the inadmissibility of the amparo action, accord-
ing to what is set forth in Article 6,5 of the Organic Law.
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The other question related to the admissibility of the amparo ac-
tion is related to the question of the existence of a pending action
or recourse already filed or brought before a court for the same
purpose of protecting a constitutional right. This question regard-
ing the admissibility of the amparo action also has some similari-
ties with the United States' injunction procedure regarding de-
fenses, called the "doctrine of the election of remedies," which is
applied when an injured party having two available but incon-
sistent remedies to redress a harm, chooses one, which is consid-
ered a binding election that forecloses the other. 141 In a similar
sense, this is the general rule in Venezuela, which is nonetheless
only applied when the plaintiff has filed other judicial means for
protection; not being applied if only administrative recourses have
been filed before the public administration organs.
1 42
This condition of inadmissibility of the amparo action when the
plaintiff has chosen to file another action has also been regulated,
in particular regarding the case of the previous filing of another
amparo action that is pending to be decided.1 43 In these cases, it is
necessary that a previous amparo action had been filed regarding
the same violation, the same action and the same persons.
XI. THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE PROCEDURE IN THE AMPARO
PROCEEDING
The extraordinary character of the amparo proceeding also con-
ditions the general rules governing the procedure, which in gen-
Decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice n' 3375 of Nov.
4, 2005, Refinadora de Maiz Venezolana, C.A. (Remavenca), y Procesadora Venezolana de
Cereales, S.A. (Provencesa) vs. Ministro de Agricultura y Tierras y efectivos de los compo-
nentes Ejdrcito y Guardia Nacional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional See also in REVISTA DE
DERECHO PiJBLICO, n* 104, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2005, pp. 239 ff.
141. See TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 56.
142. In this case, the inadmissible clause is not applied because the administrative re-
courses are not judicial ordinary means that can prevent the filing of the amparo action.
See the Decision of the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, which
decided on a decision dated Mar. 8, 1993, Federico Domingo case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PfYBLICO, n' 53-54, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1994, p. 261. See also the Deci-
sion dated May 6, 1994, Universidad Occidental Lisandro Alvarado case, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO PPBLICO, n* 57-58, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1994. See, pp. 297 ff.;
and in CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra
note 5, at 250 ff.
143. Article 6.8 of the Amparo Law provides the inadmissibility of the action for amparo
when a decision regarding another amparo suit has been brought before the courts regard-
ing the same facts and is pending decision. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 6.8. See, e.g., Decision
of the Politico Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Oct. 13, 1993,
Escuela Bdsica Juan Lovera case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 55-56, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1993, pp. 348-49.
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eral terms are related to its bilateral character; to the brief and
preferred character of the procedure; to the role of the courts di-
recting the procedure and to the need for the substantial law to
prevail regarding formalities.
In effect, as aforementioned, one of the fundamental principles
regarding the amparo proceeding is that although being of an ex-
traordinary nature, the bilateral character of the proceeding must
always be guaranteed. This implies that the amparo proceeding
must always be initiated by a party or parties (the injured or of-
fended party), so that no ex officio amparo proceeding is admissi-
ble. 144 Consequently, the amparo proceeding must always be ini-
tiated by means of an action or a recourse brought before the com-
petent court by a party against another party (the injurer or of-
fender party) whose actions or omissions have violated or have
caused harm to the complaining party's constitutional rights. This
defendant must always be brought to the procedure in order to
guarantee his rights of defense and due process.
From the amparo proceeding, its final outcome is always a judi-
cial order, as also happens in the United States with the writs of
injunction, mandamus or error, which are directed to the injuring
party ordering him to do or to abstain from doing something, or to
suspend the effects, or in some cases, to annul the damaging
act. 145 In Venezuela, as already mentioned, the amparo statutes
not only refer to the amparo as a remedy or as the final court writ-
ten order (writ) commanding the defendant to do or refrain from
doing some specific act, but in addition, it is regulated as a com-
plete proceeding that is specifically designed to protect constitu-
tional rights following an adversary procedure according to the
"cases or controversy" requirement. All the phases or stages of the
procedure are regulated. The procedure ends with a judicial deci-
144. Only in cases of habeas corpus actions do some amparo laws provide for the power
of the courts to initiate the proceeding ex officio. GUATEMALA CONSTITUTION, art. 86;
HONDURAS CONSTITUTION, art. 20.
145. The amparo suit has similarities with the civil suit for an injunction in the United
States that an injured party can bring before a court to seek for the enforcement or restora-
tion of his violated rights or for the prevention of their violation. It also can be identified
with a "suit for mandamus," brought by an injured party before a court against a public
officer whose omission has caused harm to the plaintiff, in order to seek for a writ ordering
the former to perform a duty that the law requires him to do but he refuses or neglects to
perform. Also, the suit for amparo has similarities with a "suit for writ of error" brought
before the competent superior court by an injured party whose constitutional rights have
been violated by a judicial decision, seeking the annulment or the correction of the judicial
wrong or error.
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sion or judicial order directed to protect the constitutional rights of
the injured party.
Consequently, the general rule in the amparo proceeding is that
although it is brief and speedy, the procedural adversary principle
or the aforementioned principle of bilateralism must be preserved,
assuring the presence of both parties and the respect of the due
process constitutional guarantees, particularly the rights to de-
fense. 146 That is why no definitive amparo adjudication can be
issued without the participation of the defendant or at least with-
out his knowledge about the filing of the action. The exception to
this rule being very rare, as is the case of Colombia, where the
Tutela Law admits the possibility for the court to grant the consti-
tutional protection (tutela) in limine litis, that is, "without any
formal consideration and without previous enquiry, if the decision
is founded in an evidence that shows the grave and imminent vio-
lation of harm to the right."'147
This Colombian provision undoubtedly was inspired by the 1988
Venezuelan Amparo Law that also provided for the possibility for
the amparo judge "to immediately restore the infringed juridical
situation, without considerations of mere form and without any
kind of brief enquiry," requiring in such cases, that "the amparo
protection be founded in evidence constituting a grave presump-
tion of the violation of harm of violation."'148 Nonetheless, in Vene-
zuela this article was annulled by the former Supreme Court,
which refused to interpret it in harmony with the constitution, as
only providing for preliminary decisions and as not intending to
establish the possibility of a definitive amparo decision that could
be issued inaudita parte because such action would be unconstitu-
tional. In particular, a popular action was filed in 1988 before the
former Supreme Court of Justice based on the alleged unconstitu-
tionality of such provision. In it, it was requested from the Su-
preme Court to interpret it according to the constitution (secun-
dum constitucione), in the sense that what was intended with the
provision was to establish a legal authorization for the courts to
simply adopt, in an immediate way, preliminary protective
measures, pending the resolution of the case, but not definitive
146. Thus, a judicial guarantee of constitutional rights like the amparo suit can in no
way transform itself into a proceeding violating the other constitutional guarantees, such
as the right to defense. Except regarding preliminary judicial orders, the principle of audi
alteram partem ("hear the other party" or 'listen to both sides") must then always be re-
spected.
147. Tutela Law of Columbia, Art. 18.
148. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 22 (referring to the 1988 version).
Vol. 49
Spring 2011 The Amparo Proceeding in Venezuela
amparo decisions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation, and in a decision dated May 21, 1996, eventually
annulled Article 22 of the Amparo Law considering that it violated
in a flagrant way the constitutional right to defense. 149 The adjec-
tive consequence was that failing to interpret the norm according
to the constitution, no legal support could be identified in the spe-
cial Amparo Law empowering the courts to adopt provisional or
preliminary relief,150 which were then adopted applying the gen-
eral provisions of the Procedural Civil Code.
Because the amparo suit is an extraordinary remedy for the
immediate protection of constitutional rights, its main feature is
the brief and prompt character of the procedure, which is justified
because the purpose of the action is to immediately protect per-
sons in cases of irreparable injuries or threats to constitutional
rights. This irreparable character of the harm or threat and the
immediate need for protection have been the key elements that
have molded the procedural rules of the amparo proceeding. Such
considerations have also dictated injunctions in the United States,
where the judicial doctrine on the matter is also that "an injunc-
tion is granted only when required to avoid immediate and irrepa-
rable damage to legally recognized rights, such as property rights,
constitutional rights or contractual rights.' 151
149. This Article, as mentioned, allowed the courts to adopt final decisions on amparo
matters in cases of grave violations of constitutional rights, reestablishing the harmed
constitutional right without any formal or summary inquiry and without hearing the plain-
tiff or potential injurer. Even if the Article could have been constitutionally interpreted as
only directed to allow the adoption of inaudita partem preliminary decisions or injunctions
in the proceeding, the Supreme Court considered its contents as a vulgar and flagrant
violation of the constitutional right to self-defense, and annulled it. See decision n* 644 of
the Supreme Court of Justice of May 21, 1996, in GACETA OFIcIAL EXTRA. n' 5071 of May
29, 1996, and in REVISTA DE DERECHO PfJBLICO, no 65-66, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1996, pp.332 ff. See the comments in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, INSTITUCIONES
POLfTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, ToMo V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note
5, at 388-96; and in Chavero, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN
VENEZUELA, supra note 5, AT 212, 266 FF., 410 FF.
150. See the comments in BREWER-CARtAS, INSTITUCIONES POLfTICAS Y
CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCION DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 398.
151. Consequently, "[t]here must be some vital necessity for the injunction so that one of
the parties will not be damaged and left without adequate remedy." Treadwell v. Inv.
Franchises, Inc., 543 S.E.2d 729, 730 (Ga. 2001). In other words, to warrant an injunction
it ordinarily must be clearly shown that some act has been done, or is threatened, which
will produce irreparable injury to the party asking for the injunction, U.S. v. Am. Friends
Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, (1974). In the same sense it has been established that, "[t]he very
function of an injunction is to furnish preventative relief against irreparable mischief or
injury, and the remedy will not be awarded where it appears to the satisfaction of the court
that the injury complained of is not of such character." State Comm'n on Human Rels. v.
Talbot Cnty. Det. Ctr., 803 A.2d 527, 542 (Md. 2002). More specifically, a permanent, man-
datory injunction, a preliminary, interlocutory or temporary injunction, a preliminary
213
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The same principles also apply to the amparo proceeding, origi-
nating with the configuration of a brief and preferred procedure,
precisely justified because of the protective purpose of the action
and the immediate protection required because of the violations of
constitutional rights. For these purposes, Article 27 of the Vene-
zuelan Constitution expressly provides that the procedure of the
constitutional amparo action must be oral, public, brief, free and
not subject to formality.
152
One of the consequences of the brief and prompt character of the
procedure in the amparo proceeding is its preferred character that
imposes, as it is provided in the Venezuelan Constitution, that
"any time will be workable time, and the courts will give prefer-
ence to the amparo regarding any other matter."'15 3 This preferred
character of the procedure also implies that the procedure must be
followed with preference, so when an amparo action is filed, the
courts must postpone all other matters of different nature. 154
In the amparo procedure, as a general rule, due to its brief
character, the procedural terms cannot be extended, nor suspend-
ed, nor interrupted, except in cases expressly set forth in the stat-
ute. Any delay in the procedure is the responsibility of the courts.
mandatory injunction, or a preliminary, interlocutory or temporary restraining order, will
not, as a general rule, be granted where it is not shown that an irreparable injury is imme-
diately impending and will be inflicted on the petitioner before the case can be brought to a
final hearing, "no matter how likely it may be that the moving party will prevail on the
merits." Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d. 106, 114 (Mass. 1980). See
also 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 192 (2004).
152. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 27. Regarding some of these principles, the Venezuelan First
Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, even before the sanctioning of the
Amparo Law in 1988, ruled that because of the brief character of the procedure, it must be
understood as having "the condition of being urgent, thus it must be followed promptly and
decided in the shortest possible time." Additionally, the First Court determined that it
must be summary, in the sense that "the procedure must be simple, uncomplicated, without
incidences and complex formalities." In this sense, the procedure must not be converted in
a complex and confused procedural situation." See Decision of Jan. 17, 1985, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO PUJBLICO, n' 21, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1985, p. 140. According
to these principles, the 1988 Venezuelan Amparo Law provided for the brief, prompt and
summary procedure that governed the amparo proceeding up to the enactment of the 1999
Constitution, when the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice inter-
preted the provisions of the Law, according to the new constitution, in some way rewriting
its regulations through constitutional interpretation. See the Decision of the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice n ° 7 dated Feb. 1, 2000 (Case Josg Amando
Mejia), in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n' 81, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
2000, pp. 245 if. See the comments in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARtAS, EL SISTEMA DE JUSTICIA
CONSTITUCIONAL EN LA CONSTITUCION DE 1999. COMENTARIOS SOBRE SU DESARROLLO
JURISPRUDENCIAL Y SU EXPLICACION, A VECES ERRADA, EN LA ExPosICI6N DE MoTrvos, Edi-
torial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2000; CHAVERO, EL NUEVO R9GIMEN DEL AMPARO
CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at 203 ff.
153. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 27.
154. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 13.
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In addition, Article 11 of the Amparo Law restricts motions to
recuse judges, establishing specific and prompt procedural rules
regarding the cases of impeding situations of the competent judges
to resolve the case.
Another principle governing the procedural rules in matters of
amparo, in order to guarantee the brief and prompt character of
the procedure, is the principle of the prevalence of substantive law
over formal provisions, which, for instance, is referred to in the
Venezuelan Constitution as a general principle applicable to all
proceedings, 155 regarding the prevalence of "substantive justice"
over "formal justice."
Another aspect to be analyzed regarding the procedure in the
amparo proceeding refers to the specific configuration of the main
phases or steps of the procedure, in particular, those related to the
filing of the petition, the court decision on the admissibility of the
action, the evidence activity, the defendant's pleading, and the
hearing of the case.
The first specific trend to be highlighted regarding the judicial
procedure of the amparo proceeding refers to the formalities of the
petitions that are to be brought before the courts, being the gen-
eral principle that the petition must be filed in writing, as is the
case regarding injunctions in the United States. 156 Nonetheless,
the Amparo Law allows the oral presentation of the amparo in
cases of urgency,1 57 in which the petitions must be subsequently
ratified in writing.
In any case, in the written text of the action, the petitioner must
always express in a clear and precise manner, all of the necessary
elements regarding the alleged right to be protected and the ar-
guments for the admissibility of the action. That is why the Am-
paro Law establishes, in general terms, the minimal content of the
petition or complaint, which in particular must refer to the follow-
ing aspects.5 8 First, the complete identification and information
regarding the plaintiff, and if someone is acting on behalf of the
plaintiff, his identification is also required. If the plaintiff is an
artificial person, the references regarding its registration as well
as the representative's complete identification are also required.
Second, the petition must establish the individuation of the in-
jured party. Third, the detailed narration of the circumstances in
155. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 26.
156. See 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 310 (2004).
157. Venez. Amparo Law, Arts. 16, 18.
158. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 18.
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which the harm or the threat has been caused, and the act, action,
omission or fact causing the harm or threat must be identified.
Fourth, the written text of the petition must indicate the constitu-
tional right or guarantee that has been violated, harmed or
threatened, with precise reference to the articles of the constitu-
tion or the international treaties containing the rights or guaran-
tees claimed to be violated or harmed. Fifth, the plaintiff must
specify the particular protective request asked from the court as
well as the judicial order to be issued in protection of his rights
that is requested from the court. Finally, the plaintiff must argue
about the fulfillment of the conditions for the admissibility of the
action, in particular, regarding the inadequacy of other possible
judicial remedies and the irreparable injury the plaintiff will suf-
fer without the amparo suit protection.
159
In order to soften the consequences of not mentioning correctly
all the above-mentioned requirements that have to be contained
within the written text of the petition, the Amparo Law, in protec-
tion of the injured party's right to sue, provides that the courts are
obliged to return to the plaintiff the petition that does not conform
with those requirements in order for the plaintiff to make the nec-
essary corrections. Consequently, in these cases, the petition will
not be considered inadmissible because of formal inadequacies
regarding the noncompliance with the petition's requirements set
forth in the statutes, and in order to have them corrected or
mended the court must return it to the petitioner for him to cor-
rect it in a brief amount of time. Only if the petitioner does not
make the corrections will the complaint be rejected.
160
The second important phase of the procedure in the amparo pro-
ceeding is the power of the competent courts at the beginning of
the procedure to decide upon the admission of the petition when
all the admissibility conditions set forth in the Amparo Law are
satisfied. Consequently, the courts are empowered to decide in
limine litis about the inadmissibility of the action when the peti-
tion does not accomplish in a manifest way the conditions deter-
mined in the statute; for instance, when the term to file the action
is evidently exhausted; when the challenged act is one of those
excluded from the amparo protection; when there are ordinary
means for the protection of the rights that must be previously filed
or that give adequate protection; or when ordinary judicial means
159. In a similar way as in the injunction petition in the United States. See 43A C.J.S.
INJUNCTIONS § 314 (2004).
160. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 19.
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that can adequately guarantee the claimed rights have already
been filed.
The main effect of the admission decision of the action is for the
court to notify the interested parties of the initiation of the pro-
cess, to request from the defendant a report on the violations, and
to adopt, if necessary, preliminary amparo decisions for the imme-
diate protection of the harmed or threatened constitutional
rights, pending the development of the process.
The third phase in the amparo proceeding refers to the evidence
activity and the burden of proof. As has been mentioned, the am-
paro suit is a specific judicial means regulated in order to obtain
the immediate protection of constitutional rights and guarantees
when the aggrieved or injured parties have no other adequate ju-
dicial means for such purpose. That is why this situation must be
alleged and proven by the claimant. This implies that in order to
file an amparo action and to obtain immediate judicial protection,
the violation of the constitutional right must be a flagrant, vulgar,
direct and immediate one, caused by a perfectly determined act or
omission. Regarding the harm or injury caused to the constitu-
tional rights, it must be manifestly arbitrary, illegal or illegiti-
mate, a consequence of a violation of the constitution. All these
aspects for obtaining the immediate judicial protection must be
clear and ostensible, the plaintiff being obliged to argue them in
his petition and support it with the needed evidence.
Consequently, as it is also established in the United States re-
garding injunctions, 161 in the amparo proceeding, the plaintiff has
the burden to prove the existence of the right, the alleged viola-
tions of threat, and the illegitimate character of the action causing
it with clear and convincing evidence. The consequence of the
aforementioned is that in matters of amparo, due to the brief and
prompt character of the procedure, the immediate protection of
constitutional rights that can be granted needs to be based on ex-
isting sufficient evidence.
Accordingly, the courts have rejected amparo actions in complex
cases where a major debate is needed, and in cases in which proof
is difficult to provide, which is considered incompatible with the
brief and prompt character of the amparo suit that requires that
the alleged violation be "manifestly" illegitimate and harming.
161. See 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 310 (2004).
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Even without clear provisions on the matter, this principle has
been applied by the courts in Venezuela.
162
In this matter of constitutional protection, the courts have ex of
ficio powers to obtain evidence, provided that it does not cause an
irreparable prejudice to the parties. 163 On the other hand, the
general principle in the amparo procedure is that all kinds of evi-
dence is admitted, so the court can base its decision to grant the
required protection on any type of evidence.
The fifth important phase of the amparo proceeding is the need
for the court to notify the aggrieving party in order to request from
it a formal written answer or report regarding the alleged viola-
tions of constitutional rights of the plaintiff, to which, in addition,
the defendant can put forward his counter evidence, before the
hearing on it.164 Due to the bilateral and adversarial character of
the procedure, as also happens in the injunctive relief procedure in
the United States, an amparo ruling must not be issued until the
defendant has been asked to file his plea.
165
The defendant's answer or plea regarding the harm or threat al-
leged by the plaintiff, must be sent to the court within a very brief
term of forty-eight hours.166 The omission of the defendant to send
his report or plea in answer to the court implies that the plaintiffs
alleged facts must be considered as accepted by the defendant.
167
Finally, one of the most important phases in the procedure is
the hearing that the court must convene, also in a very prompt
period of time, seeking the participation of the parties before
adopting its decision on the case. 68 This hearing which must be
162. See CHAVERO, EL NUEVO REGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA,
supra note 5, at 340.
163. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 17.
164. This is what was established in Article 24 of the Venezuelan Amparo Law, which
nonetheless has been eliminated by the Constitutional Chamber in its decision n° 7 of Feb-
ruary 1, 2000, Jos6 A. Mejia et al. (issue interpreting the Amparo Law according to the new
1999 Constitution, and reshaping the amparo suit procedure). See in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PfOBLICO, no 81, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2000, pp. 349 ff; CHAVERO, EL
NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at 264 ff.;
Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El juez constitucional como legislador positivo y la inconstitucional
reforma de la Ley Orgdnica de Amparo mediante sentencias interpretativas, in EDUARDO
FERRER MAc-GREGOR Y ARTURO ZALDNVAR LELO DE LARREA (COORDINATORS), LA CIENCIA
DEL DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL. EsTuDios EN HOMENAJE A HtCTOR FX-ZAMUDIO
EN SUS CINCUENTA ANOS COMO INVESTIGADOR DEL DERECHO, Instituto de Investigaciones
Juridicas, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico, M6xico 2008, Tomo V, pp. 63-80.
165. See 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 318 (2004).
166. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 24.
167. Id.
168. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 26.
Vol. 49218
Spring 2011 The Amparo Proceeding in Venezuela 219
oral, public and contradictory, in principle must always take place
and must not be suspended.
The absence of the defendant's participation in the hearing, in
general terms, does not produce its suspension, in which case, the
evidence presented by the plaintiff will be accepted and the court
must then proceed to decide. Regarding the plaintiff, his absence
from the hearing is understood as his abandonment of the action.
The final decision of the amparo proceeding must be adopted af-
ter the hearing has taken place, although the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal has established that in matters
of amparo the court must make its decision in the same hearing or
trial. 169
XII. THE PRELIMINARY PROTECTIVE MEASURES ON MATTERS OF
AMPARO
The purpose of the amparo proceeding eventually is for the
plaintiff to obtain a judicial adjudication from a competent court,
providing for the immediate protection of his harmed or threat-
ened constitutional rights. These judicial decisions, for instance,
may restrain some actions, preserve the status quo, or command
or prohibit actions.
170
169. In Venezuela, the Amparo Law established that the decision ought to be issued in
the following days after the hearing. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 24. Nonetheless, the Con-
stitutional Chamber in decision n0 7 of February 1, 2000 (Josg A. Mejia et al. case), has
modified this provision, providing that the decision must be issued at the end of the hear-
ing. See in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 81, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
2000, pp. 349 ff.
170. In a very similar way, the injunctive decisions that the United States' courts can
adopt injunctions for the immediate protection of rights, which can consist of restrain ac-
tion or interference of some kind. Putnam v. Fortenberry, 589 N.W.2d 838 (Neb. 1999);
Anderson v. Granite School Dist., 413 P.2d 597 (Utah 1996). Courts in the United States
may also impose injunctions to furnish preventive relief against irreparable mischief or
injury; or to preserve the status quo. Sndyer v. Sullivan, 705 P.2d 510 Colo 1985); Jenkins
v. Pedersen, 212 N.W.2d 415 (Iowa 1973). An injunction is a remedy designed to prevent
irreparable injury by prohibiting or commanding certain acts. Nat'l Compressed Steel
Corp. v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 38 P.3d 723 (Kan. 2002). The function of in-
junctive relief is to restrain motion and to enforce inaction. State ex rel. Great Lakes Col-
lege, Inc. v Med. Bd., 280 N.E.2d 900 (Ohio 1972). An injunction is designed to prevent
harm, not redress harm; it is not compensatory. Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or.
1985); Simenstad v. Hagen, 126 N.W.2d 529 (Wis. 1964). The remedy grants prospective,
as opposed to retrospective, relief, Jefferson v. Big Horn Cnty., 4 P.3d 26 (Mont. 2000), and
it is preventive, protective or restorative. United States v. White Cnty. Bridge Comm'n,
275 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1960); Colendrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 761 A.2d 899 (Md.
2003); Stoetzel & Sons, Inc. v. City of Hatings, 658 N.W.2d 636 (Neb. 2003); Hunsaker v.
Kersh, 991 P.2d 67 (Utah 1999). However, an injunction is not addressed to past wrongs.
Snyder v. Sullivan, 705 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1985). See generally 43A CJS INJUNCTIONS § 2.
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Amparo and injunctions are both extraordinary remedies having
the same purpose, the main difference between them being the
rights to be protected. In the United States, injunctions are equi-
table remedies that can be used for the protection of any kind of
personal or property rights. On the other hand, in Latin America,
the amparo proceeding is conceived only for the protection of con-
stitutional rights, which explains its regulations in the constitu-
tions, and not for the protection of rights established in statutes.
171
In this matter of the amparo proceeding, as well as in matters of
injunctions, two general sorts of judicial adjudications can be is-
sued by the courts for the protection of constitutional rights: pre-
liminary measures that can be ordered from the beginning of the
procedure, with effects subject to the final court ruling; and defini-
tive decisions preventing the violation or restoring the enjoyment
of the threatened or harmed rights.
In Venezuela, as in all Latin American countries, according to
the general regulations established in the Civil Procedure Codes,
all courts are empowered to adopt, during the course of a proce-
171. In this sense, in Venezuela the courts have ruled that the harm caused must al-
ways be the result of a violation of a constitutional right that must be "flagrant, vulgar,
direct and immediate, which does not mean that the right or guaranty is not due to be
regulated in statutes, but it is not necessary for the court to base its decision in the latter to
determine if the violation of the constitutional right has effectively occurred." Supreme
Court of Justice, Tarjetas Banvenez case, decision n' 343 of July 10, 1991, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO PPBLICO, n 47, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1991, pp. 169-170. See
also Decision of May 20, 1994, First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions,
Federacin Venezolana de Deportes Ecuestres Case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n'
57-58, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1994, pp. 284 ff.. In other words, only direct
and evident constitutional violations can be protected by means of amparo; thus, for in-
stance, as ruled in 1991 by the same First Court, the internal electoral regime of political
parties or of professional associations could not be the object of an amparo action founded
in the right to vote set forth in the constitution, "which only applies to the national elec-
toral process [not being applied] to the internal electoral process of the political parties,"
concluding that the amparo "only protects constitutional rights and guaranties and not
legal (statutory) ones, and much less the ones contained in association's by laws." Decision
of Aug. 23, 1991, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, n° 47, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas, 1991, pp. 129 ff. In other decisions, the courts declared inadmissible amparo
actions for the protection of rights when the allegations were only founded "in legal (statu-
tory) considerations," as the right to work commonly conditioned by statutes regarding
dismissals. Thus, the amparo is not the judicial mean for the protection of such right if the
violation is only referring to the labor law provisions. See Decision of the First Court of
Oct. 8, 1990, Rafael Rojas case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO, n' 44, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, pp. 139-40. In a similar sense, the violation of the right to self-
defense because a party's right to cross-examine a witness was denied according to Article
349 of the Civil Procedural Code cannot be founded in Article 68 of the Constitution be-
cause it implies the need to analyze norms of legal rank and not of constitutional rank. In
this regard it was decided by the former Supreme Court of Justice, Politico Administrative
Chamber, decision n° 614 of Nov. 8, 1990, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PPBLICO, n° 44, Editori-
al Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1990, pp. 140-41.
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dure, what are called "medidas preventivas" or "medidas caute-
lares," that is, interlocutory and temporal judicial measures that
are also applied to the amparo proceeding. The expression refers
to interlocutory or preliminary measures; so in this sense, a "me-
dida preventiva" is not equivalent to the English expression "pre-
ventive measure," which is used in the sense of preventing or
avoiding harm, and can be decided both in a definitive or a prelim-
inary injunction.172 That is, both the definitive and preliminary
judicial amparo decisions can have "preventive" effects in the
sense of preventing harms or preserving the status quo, the pre-
liminary ones having only a temporary basis, pending the termi-
nation of the procedure. 173 Consequently, in order to avoid confu-
sion, I use the expression "preliminary" measures to identify what
in the Latin American procedural law are called "medidas preven-
tivas" or "medidas cautelares," as interlocutory, preliminary and
temporal judicial protective measures that can be issued pending
the procedure, similar to the United States "preliminary injunc-
tions" also issued as interlocutory and temporal relief pending the
trial.17
4
Based on this distinction between preliminary measures ("caute-
lares') and definitive adjudications or decisions, the amparo pro-
ceeding in Venezuela is not just of a "cautelar" or preliminary na-
ture, and on the contrary, it seeks to protect in a definitive way
the constitutional right alleged as harmed or threatened. The pre-
cision is important because in some countries a distinction has
172. In other words, as explained by Tabb and Shoben: "Itihe classic form of injunctions
in private litigation is the preventive injunction. By definition, a preventive injunction is a
court order designed to avoid future harm to a party by prohibiting or mandating certain
behavior by another party. The injunction is 'preventive' in the sense of avoiding harm. The
wording may be either prohibitory ("do not trespass') or mandatory ("remove the obstruc-
tion")." TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 22.
173. As the same authors Tabb & Shoben have said:
[u]pon a compelling showing by the plaintiff, the court may issue a coercive order
even before full trial on the merits. A preliminary injunction gives the plaintiff tem-
porary relief pending trial on the merit. A temporary restraining order affords imme-
diate relief pending the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Both of these types of
interlocutory relief are designed to preserve the status quo to prevent irreparable
harm before a court can decide the substantive merits of the dispute. Such orders are
available only upon a strong showing of the necessity for such relief and may be con-
ditioned upon the claimant posting a bond or sufficient security to protect the inter-
ests of the defendant in the event that the injunction is later determined to have been
wrongfully issued.
TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 4.
174. In both cases, the preliminary measures are different from the final judicial protec-
tive (permanent injunction) decisions, which can have preventive or restorative effects. See
43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 6 (2004).
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been made in procedural law between "cautelar" measures and
"cautelar" actions, causing some terminological confusion when
giving to the amparo the character of a "cautelar" action. In such
cases, the expression is used, not in the sense of just having a
"preliminary" nature, but in the sense of being confined to decide
the immediate protection of a constitutional right without resolv-
ing any other matters or merits of the controversy.
175
However, putting aside these terminological differences, in the
amparo procedure, preliminary measures can be adopted by the
courts pending the final adjudication and with effects during the
development of the procedure, in order to preserve the status quo,
avoiding harms or restoring the plaintiffs situation to the original
one it had before the harm was inflicted. These preliminary
measures are regulated in the Amparo Law and the Civil Proce-
dure Code in two ways.
First, by establishing a precise and identified measure, called a
medidas cautelares nominada, as is the case of the suspension of
the effects of the challenged act of the amparo action. This is the
most common preliminary judicial measure expressly established
in the Amparo Law. When the action is filed against state acts,
particularly administrative acts, the power is given to the courts
to suspend their effects, at the request of the affected party, dur-
ing the course of the procedure and pending the final decision of the
proceeding. 176 Also, in addition to the provision establishing the
court's possible decision to suspend the effects of the challenged
acts, in the case of the filing of the amparo petition conjunctively
175. In this sense, in Ecuador and Chile, the amparo proceeding has been considered to
have "cautelar" nature, but in another sense, not equivalent to a "preliminary" nature. The
Constitutional Court of Ecuador, for instance, has decided as follows:
[t]hat the amparo action set forth in Article 95 of the Constitution is in essence caute-
lar regarding the constitutional rights, not allowing [the court] to decide on the mer-
its or to substitute the proceedings set forth in the legal order for the resolution of a
controversy, but only to suspend the effects of an authority act which harms those
rights; and the decisions issued in the amparo suit do not produce res judicata, so the
authority, once having corrected the incurred defects, may go back to the matter and
issue a new act, providing it is adjusted to the constitutional and legal provisions.
HERNAN SALGADO PESANTES, MANUAL DE JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL ECUATORIANA, Corpo-
raci6n Editora Nacional, Quito, 2004, p. 78.
In a similar way, in Chile the action for protection has been considered to have a "cautelar"
nature, not in the sense of "preliminary" measures, but as tending to obtain a definitive
protective adjudication regarding constitutional rights. See EDUARDO SOTO KLOSS, EL
RECURSO DE PROTECCI6N. ORIGENES, DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA, Editorial Juridica de
Chile, Santiago, 1982, p. 248; see also JUAN MANUEL ERRAZURIZ AND JORGE MIGUEL OTERO
A., ASPECTOS PROCESALES DEL RECURSO DE PROTECCION, Editorial Juridica de Chile, San-
tiago, 1989, pp. 34-38.
176. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 5.
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with other actions seeking judicial review of statutes or adminis-
trative acts, the amparo essentially has suspensive effects.
177
Second, without any particular enumeration, other measures
that can be adopted by the courts in order to protect the injured
right are the medidas cautelares innominadas according to the
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.
In order to adopt all these preliminary measures, a few condi-
tions must be met as has been established by the jurisprudence of
the courts. The courts must consider, first, "the appearance of the
existence of a good right" (fumus boni juris), that is, the need for
the petitioner to prove the existence of his constitutional right or
guarantee as being violated or threatened. Second, the "danger
because of the delay" (periculum in mora), that is, the need to
prove that the delay in granting the preliminary protection will
make the harm irreparable. Third, the "danger of the harm" (per-
iculum in dammi"), that is the need to prove the imminence of the
harm that can be caused. Fourth, the balance between the collec-
tive and particular interest involved in the case.178 As ruled by
the Politico Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of
Justice of Venezuela, in a decision n° 488 dated March 16, 2000:
In order for an anticipated protective measure to be granted,
due to its preliminary content it is necessary to examine the
existence of three essential elements, always balancing the
collective or individual interest; such conditions are:
1. Fumus Boni Iuris, that is, the reasonable appearance of
the existence of a "good right" in the hands of the petitioner
177. When the amparo action is filed jointly with the judicial review popular action for
nullity against statutes, or with the judicial review of administrative actions recourse, the
amparo petition has always had this preliminary (cautelar) character, in the sense that the
decision granting the amparo pending the principal nullity suit is always of a preliminary
character of suspension of the effects of the challenged act. Thus, in the case of statutes,
the Constitutional Chamber, the competent court, decides to suspend its effects, in such
cases, even with erga omnes effects. See CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO
CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at 468 ff., 327 ff.; BREWER-CARIAS,
INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMo V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCION DE
AMPARO, supra note 5, at 277. Regarding administrative acts, the courts of the Administra-
tive Jurisdiction are the ones that can decide the matter of the suspension of the effects of
the administrative challenged act, pending the judicial review proceeding final decision.
BREWER-CARiAS, INSTITUCIONES POITICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y
LA ACC16N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 281.
178. As for instance has been decided by the Venezuelan First Court on Judicial Review
of Administrative Actions, Video & Juegos Costa Verde, C.A. vs. Prefecto del Municipio
Maracaibo del Estado Zulia case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, n0 85-98, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2001, p. 291.
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alleging its violation, an appearance that must derive from
the written evidences (documents) attached to the petition.
2. Periculum in mora, that is, the danger that the definitive
ruling could be illusory, due to the delay in resolving the inci-
dent of the suspension.
3. Periculum in Damni, that is, the imminence of the harm
caused by the presumptive violation of the fundamental rights
of the petitioner and its irreparability. These elements are
those that basically allow one to seek the necessary anticipa-
tory protection of the constitutional rights and guaranties.
179
All these general conditions for the issuance of the preliminary
protective measures are very similar to those prerequisites needed
to be tested by the United States' courts when issuing preliminary
injunctions, which are: (1) a probability of prevailing on the mer-
its; (2) an irreparable injury if the relief is delayed; (3) a balance of
hardship favoring the plaintiff; (4) and a showing that the injunc-
tion would not be adverse to the public interest; all of which must
be proven by the plaintiff.
180
Due to the extraordinary character of the amparo action, the
preliminary protective measures requested by the plaintiff, if the
above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled, can be decided and is-
sued by the court in an immediate way, even without a previous
hearing of the potential defendants. That is, inadi alteram parte
or inaudita pars, as it is expressly provided in the Civil Procedure
Code. In a similar sense, the courts in the United States, in cases
of great urgency and when an immediate threat of irreparable in-
jury exists, can issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders
without giving reasonable notice to the defendant, but always bal-
ancing the harm sought to be preserved with the rights of notice
and hearing. 181
Finally, the general rule is that in the amparo proceeding, as in
the United States, 8 2 the effects of the preliminary measures are
essentially modifiable or revocable by the court, particularly at the
request of the defendant or of third parties.
179. See the Politico Administrative Chamber decision no 488 of March 16, 2000, Cons-
tructora Pedeca, CA. vs. Gobernaci6n del Estado Anzodtegui case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO
PtBLICO, n' 81, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2000, p. 459.
180. See TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53 at 63.
181. See 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 305 (2004).
182. See, e.g., 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 368 (2004).
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On the other hand, the preliminary measures have effects dur-
ing the course of the procedure, finishing with the definitive deci-
sion granting or rejecting the amparo. Nonetheless, if the final
decision grants the amparo, the effects of the preliminary
measures will be kept and will be converted if definitive.
XIII. THE DEFINITVE JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION ON MATTERS OF
AMPARO
Regarding the definitive judicial decisions in the amparo pro-
ceedings, their purpose for the injured party (the plaintiff) is to
obtain the requested judicial protection (amparo) of his constitu-
tional rights when illegitimately harmed or threatened by an in-
juring party (the defendant).
Consequently, the final result of the amparo process, character-
ized by its bilateral nature that imposes the need for the defend-
ants to have the right to participate and to be heard, 183 is a formal
judicial decision or order issued by the court. Such order, as is
also the case with the injunctions, is for the protection of the
threatened rights or to restore the enjoyment of the harmed party,
which can consist, for instance, of a decision commanding or pre-
venting an action, or commanding someone to do, not to do or to
undo some action. 8 4 This is to say, the amparo, as the injunc-
tion, 85 is a writ framed according to the circumstances of the case
commanding an act that the court regards as essential to justice,
or restraining an act that it deems contrary to equity and good
conscience.
Consequently, the function of the amparo court's decision is, on
the one hand, to prevent the defendant from inflicting further in-
jury on the plaintiff that can be of a prohibitory or mandatory
183. Similarly, regarding definitive injunctions, they only can be granted if process is-
sues and service is made on the defendant. See, e.g., 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 304 (2004).
184. In the United States' injunction, the order can be "commanding or preventing vir-
tually any type of action". 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 1 (citing Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So.
2d 333 (Ala. 2001); Levin v. Barish, 481 A.2d 1183 (Pa. 1984). The injunction may also be
imposed to command an individual to redress some wrong or other injury." 43A C.J.S.
INJUNCTIONS § 1 (citing. State Game & Fish Com'n v. Sledge, 42 S.W.3d 427 (Ark. 2001).
"It is a judicial order requiring a person to do or refrain from doing certain acts" 43A C.J.S.
INJUNCTIONS § 1 (citing. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4 (111. 2000). The
order requires an individual to refrain "for any period of time, no matter its purpose." 43A
C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 1 (citing Sheridan County Elec. Co-op v. Ferguson, 227 P.2d 597
(Mont. 1951)).
185. 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 1 (2004).
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character; or on the other hand, to correct the present by undoing
the effects of a past wrong. 1
8 6
That is why the amparo judicial order in Venezuela, as in all
Latin American countries, even without the distinction between
equitable remedies and extraordinary law remedies, is very simi-
lar in its purposes and effects not only to the United States' in-
junction, but also to the other equitable and non-equitable ex-
traordinary remedies, like the mandamus, prohibition and declar-
atory legal remedies. Accordingly, for instance, the amparo order
can be first, of a prohibitory character, similar to the prohibitory
injunctions issued to restrain an action, to forbid certain acts or to
command a person to refrain from doing specific acts. Second, it
can also be of a mandatory character, that is, like the mandatory
injunction requiring the undoing of an act, or the restoring of the
status quo. The amparo may also act like the writ of mandamus,
issued to compel an action or the execution of some act, or to
command a person to do a specific act. Third, the amparo order
can also be similar to the writ of prohibition or to the writ of error
when the order is directed to a court, 187 which normally happens
in the cases of amparo actions filed against judicial decisions.
Fourth, it can also be similar to the declaratory legal remedy
through which courts are called to declare the constitutional right
of the plaintiff regarding the other parties.
Consequently, in the amparo proceeding, the courts have very
extensive powers to provide for remedies in order to effectively
protect constitutional rights, issuing final adjudication orders to
do, to refrain from doing, to undo or to prohibit, 188 or as the Am-
paro Law establishes in Article 32,b the decision must "determine
the conduct to be accomplished." 1
89
The judicial amparo order can be of a restorative or of a preven-
tive nature. In the first case, it may consist of an order seeking for
the reestablishment of the juridical situation of the plaintiff to the
stage it had before the violation or to the most similar one. In the
second case, when of a preventive nature, it can consist in compel-
186. This is similar to the "preventive injunction" and to the "restorative or reparative
injunction," in the United States. See TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 86-89; 43A C.J.S.
INJUNCTIONS § 8 (2004).
187. See TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 86, 246; 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS § 5 (2004).
188. See BREWER-CARtAS, INSTITUCIONES POLfTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL
DERECHO Y LA ACCIN DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 143.
189. CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RPGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra
note 5, at 185 ff., 327 ff.; Brewer-Carias, INSTITUCIONES POLTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES,
ToMo V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCIN DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 399.
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ling the defendant to do or to refrain from doing certain acts in
order to maintain the enjoyment of the plaintiffs rights. Nonethe-
less, in the case of being of a restorative character, in general
terms, when the amparo action is filed against acts, particularly
authorities' acts causing the harms or threats to constitutional
rights, the immediate effect of the decision is to suspend the ef-
fects of the challenged act regarding the plaintiff, the amparo pro-
ceeding not having the purposes of annulling those state acts. In
principle, it is for the Constitutional Jurisdiction and for the Ad-
ministrative Jurisdictions' courts and not for the amparo judges to
adopt decisions annulling statutes or administrative acts.
In particular, regarding statutes and specifically self-executing
ones, when an amparo action is filed directly against them, 190 the
amparo judge when granting the amparo has no power to annul
them, and in order to protect the harmed or threatened right he
can declare their inapplicability to the plaintiff in the particular
case. The competence to annul statutes is exclusively granted to
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. 191
Regarding administrative acts, the general rule is also that the
amparo decision cannot annul the challenged administrative act,
being that the amparo judge is only empowered to suspend its ef-
fects and application to the plaintiff. The power to annul adminis-
trative acts is also exclusively a power attributed to the Adminis-
trative Jurisdiction courts.1
92
Conversely, regarding the amparo actions filed against judicial
decisions, the effects of the ruling granting the amparo protection
consists in the annulment of the challenged judicial act or deci-
sion.193
Another aspect that must be mentioned regarding amparo deci-
sions in Venezuela is that it has no compensatory character 194 be-
190. CHAVERO, EL NUEVO R9GIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra
note 5, at 468 ff.; BREWER-CARtAS, INSTITUCIONES POLfTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, ToMo
V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCIN DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 399.
191. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 336.
192. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 2591. See CHAVERO, EL NUEVO REGIMEN DEL AMPARO
CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA, supra note 5, at 358 ff.; Brewer-Carias, INSTITUCIONES
POLiTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCION DE AMPARO, supra note
5, at 144 & 400.
193. See C-AVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA,
supra note 5, at 511; BREWER-CARIAS, INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES,
TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5 at 297; BREWER-CARIAS, El
problema del amparo contra sentencias o de c6mo la Sala de Casaci6n Civil remedia arbitra.
riedadesjudiciales, supra note 123, at 157-71.
194. In a similar way to the United States injunctions. See Simenstad v. Hagen, 126
N.W.2d 529 (Wis. 1964).
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cause it is the function of the courts in these proceedings only to
protect the plaintiffs rights and not to condemn the defendant to
pay the plaintiff any sort of compensation for damages caused by
the injury. 195 That is, the amparo proceeding is, in general terms,
a preventive and restorative process, but not a compensatory
one, 196 the courts being empowered to prevent harms or to restore
the enjoyment of a right, for instance by suspending the effects of
the injuring act, but not to condemn the defendant to the payment
of a compensation. The judicial actions tending to seek compensa-
tion from the defendant, because of its liability as a consequence of
the injury inflicted to the constitutional right of the plaintiff, must
be filed by means of a separate ordinary judicial remedy estab-
lished for such purpose before the civil or administrative judicial
jurisdiction. 197
Finally, regarding the economic consequences of the amparo
suit, in Venezuela the order to pay the costs is established in a
very restrictive way, only in cases of amparo actions filed against
individuals and not against public authorities. 198
Another important aspect of the amparo definitive decisions is
related to their effects. The general rule regarding the amparo
judicial decisions is that they only have inter partes effects, that is,
between the parties that have been involved in the suit (the plain-
tiff, the defendant and the third parties) and those that have par-
ticipated in the process. So in a similar way to the injunctive deci-
sions in the United States, 199 the amparo decisions only have bind-
ing effects regarding the parties to the suit, and only regarding
the controversy; this being the most important consequence of the
personal character of the amparo, as an action mainly devoted for
the protection of personal constitutional rights or guarantees.
200
195. For instance in the case of an illegitimate administrative order issued by a munici-
pal authority demolishing a building, if executed, even if it violates the constitutional right
to property, the amparo action has not the purpose to compensate, being in this case inad-
missible, particularly due to the irreparable character of the harm.
196. See CHAVERO, EL NUEVO RtGIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA,
supra note 5, at 185, 242, 262, 326, 328; BREWER-CARiAS, INSTITUCIONES POLiTICAS Y
CONSTITUCIONALES, TOMO V, EL DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 143.
197. Article 27 of the Venezuelan Amparo Law also expressly provides that in cases of
granting an amparo, the court must send copy of the decision to the competent authority
where the public officer causing the harm works, in order to impose the corresponding
disciplinary measures. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 27.
198. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 33.
199. Seee.g., ESP Fidelity Corp. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 512 F.2d 887 (91h Cir.
1975).
200. The Venezuelan regulations can be highlighted in this regard. In principle, the
court decisions have been constant in granting the action of amparo a personal character
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The only exception to this principle in the United States refers to
the effects of the ruling when constitutional questions are decided
by the Supreme Court, in which cases, due to the doctrine of prec-
edent (stare decisis), all courts are obliged to apply the same con-
stitutional rule in cases with similar controversies. 20 1 The same
rule exists in Venezuela regarding the Constitutional Chamber
rulings 20 2 that can be issued with binding general character and
effects.
Nonetheless, the general principle of the inter partes effects also
has its exceptions due to the progressive development of the col-
lective nature of some constitutional rights, as for instance, is the
case of violation of environmental rights, indigenous people's
rights and other diffuse rights,20 3 in which cases, 204 the definitive
ruling can benefit other persons different to those that have ac-
tively participated in the procedure as plaintiff. In these cases,
due to the constitutional provision regarding the protection of dif-
fuse or collective interests, the Constitutional Chamber of the Su-
preme Tribunal has admitted action for amparo seeking the pro-
tection and enforcement of those collective interests, including for
instance, voting rights. In such cases, the Chamber has even
granted erga omnes effects to the precautionary measures adopted
"for both the individuals and entities that have filed the action for
constitutional protection and to all the voters as a group."20 5 In
where the standing belongs firstly to "the individual directly affected by the infringement of
constitutional rights and guaranties." See, e.g., the decision n
° 94 of the Constitutional
Chamber of Mar. 15, 2000, Corporaci6n 18.625 C.A case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO,
n0 81, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, 2000, pp. 322-23.
201. See ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 16, at 5.
202. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 336.
203. See CHAVERO, EL NUEVO R9GIMEN DEL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA,
supra note 5, at 333.
204. As also happens regarding the class actions in the United States. See ABERNATHY
& PERRY, supra note 16, at 6.
205. See Decision of the Constitutional Chamber n° 483 of May 29, 2000, "Queremos
Elegir"y otros case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PtBLICO, n* 82, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
2000, pp. 489-491. In the same sense, decision of the same Chamber n° 714 of July 13,
2000, APRUM Case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PtBLICO, n° 83, 2000, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, pp. 319 ff. The Constitutional Chamber has decided that "any individual is
entitled to bring suit based on diffuse or collective interests" and has extended "standing to
companies, corporations, foundations, chambers, unions and other collective entities, whose
object is the defense of society, as long as they act within the boundaries of their corporate
objects, aimed at protecting the interests of their members regarding those objects." See
Decision of the Constitutional Chamber n' 656 of May 6, 2001, Defensor del Pueblo
vs.Comisi6n Legislativa Nacional Case, available at
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Junio/656-300600-00-172 8%20.htm. See also decision n* 379
of Feb. 26, 2003, Mireya Ripanti et vs. Presidente de Petr6leos de Venezuela S.A (PDVSA)
case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PtOBLICO, n' 93-96, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
2003, pp. 152 ff.
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addition, the Office of the People's Defendant has the authority to
promote, defend, and guard constitutional rights and guaranties
"as well as the legitimate, collective or diffuse interests of the citi-
zens,"20 6 being consequently his standing admitted to file actions
for amparo on behalf of the citizens as a whole. 20 7 In all these cas-
es, the judicial ruling benefits all the persons enjoying the collec-
tive rights or interest involved.
On the other hand, as all definitive judicial decisions, the am-
paro decisions also have res judicata effects, providing stability to
the ruling. That means that the courts' decisions are binding not
only for the parties in the process or its beneficiaries, but also re-
garding the court itself, which cannot modify its ruling (immuta-
bility). Res judicata implies then, the impossibility for a new suit
to take place regarding the same matter already adopted, or that a
decision is issued in a different sense than the one already decided
in a previous process. 208 Nonetheless, on this matter, of the res
judicata effects, the scope of those effects is different when refer-
ring to the so-called "substantive" (material) or to the "formal" res
judicata effects. In general terms, the concept of "formal res judi-
cata" effects applies to judicial decisions that even when enforced
do not impede the development of a new process between the same
parties, provided that the matter has not been decided in the am-
paro proceeding on the merits of the case and its defense. On the
other hand, the concept of "substantive res judicata" effects ap-
plies when the judicial decision has been decided on the merits,
not allowing for other processes to develop regarding the same
matter.
206. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 280 & 281,2.
207. In one case the Defender of the People acted against a threat by the 2000 National
Legislative Commission to appoint the Electoral National Council members without ful-
filling constitutional requirements. In that case, the Constitutional Chamber decided that
"the Defender has standing to bring actions aimed at enforcing diffuse and collective rights
or interests" without requiring the acquiescence of the society on whose behalf he acts, but
this provision does not exclude or prevent citizens' access to the judicial system in defense
of diffuse and collective rights and interests. Decision of the Constitutional Chamber n°
656 of May 6, 2001, Defensor del Pueblo vs. Comisi6n Legislativa Nacional case, available
at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Junio/656-300600-00-1728%20.htm.
208. In contrast, these res judicata effects, as a general rule, are not applicable to the
injunction orders in the United States, which can be modified by the court. As it has been
summarized regarding the judicial doctrine on the matter: "Injunctions are different from
other judgments in the context of res judicata because the parties are often subject to the
court's continuing jurisdiction, and the court must strike a balance between the policies of
res judicata and the right of the court to apply modified measures to changed circumstanc-
es." Town of Durham v. Cutter, 428 A.2d 904 (N.H. 1981). See also Fiss & RENDLEMAN,
supra note 32, at 497-98, 526.
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The matter decided in the amparo proceeding, that is the merits
of the case, is related to the manifest illegitimate and arbitrary
harm or threat caused by an identified injuring party to the con-
stitutional right or guarantees of the plaintiff; a matter that is to
be resolved in a brief and prompt procedure. Thus, the merits on
the matters in the amparo proceeding are reduced to determining
the existence of such illegitimate and manifest violation of the
right, regardless of the other possible matters that can or may be
resolved by the parties in other processes. In this regard, Article
36 of the Venezuelan Amparo Law, giving a different approach
regarding the substantive or formal res judicata effects 20 9 provides
that "[t]he definitive amparo decision will produce legal effects
regarding the right or guaranty that has been the object of the
process, without prejudice of the actions or recourses that legally
correspond to the parties."
210
According to this provision, res judicata in the amparo proceed-
ing only refers to what has been argued and decided in the case
regarding the violation or injury inflicted to a constitutional right
or guarantee. 211 Thus, in general terms, the amparo decision does
not resolve all the other possible matters that could be raised, but
only the aspect of the violation or injury to the constitutional
rights or guarantees; this being the only aspect regarding which
the decision can produce res judicata effects. For example, if an
amparo decision is issued regarding an administrative act because
it causes harm to constitutional rights, it only has restorative or
reestablishing effects, suspending the application of the chal-
lenged act, but it does not have annulling effects.212 Consequently,
209. In this regard, the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, in a
decision dated Oct. 16, 1986, the Pedro J. Montilva case, decided that if in a case:
the action of amparo is filed with the same object, denouncing the same violations, based on
the same motives and with identical object as the previous one and directed against the
same person, then it is evident that in such case, the res judicata force applies in order to
avoid the rearguing of the case, due to the fact that the controversy to be resolved has the
same subjective and objective identity than the one already decided.
See REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, no 28, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 1986, p.
106. See also Chavero, EL NUEVO REGIMEN DEL AMIARO CONSTITUCIONAL EN VENEZUELA
supra note 5, at 338 ff.; GUSTAVO LINARES BENZO, EL PROCESO DE AMPARO EN VENEZUELA,
Caracas, 1999, p. 121.
210. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 36.
211. See First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, decision of Oct. 16,
1986, Pedro Montilva case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PUJBLICO, n0 28, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 1986, p. 106.
212. Due to this fact, by means of the amparo suit, as it has been ruled by the Supreme
Court of Venezuela, "none of the three types of judicial declarative, constitutive or to con-
demn decision can be obtained, nor, of course, the interpretative decision." Decision n
° 211
of the Politico Administrative Chamber of July 15, 1992, Comitg Campesino Provisional
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the amparo decision in such cases does not have res judicata ef-
fects regarding the judicial review action that can be filed against
the administrative act before the Administrative Jurisdiction
Courts in order to have its nullity declared.
213
In these cases, after the amparo decision has been issued, other
legal questions can remain pending to be resolved in other pro-
cesses, and that is why the amparo decision in these cases is is-
sued "without prejudice of the actions or recourses that could le-
gally correspond to the parties." 
214
One last aspect that must be highlighted regarding the effects of
the amparo decision refers to its obligatory character. As all judi-
cial decisions, the amparo ruling is obligatory not only for the par-
ties to the process but regarding all other persons or public officers
that it applies to. The defendant, for instance, is compelled to
immediately obey it, as it is expressly set forth in the Amparo
Law.
2 1 5
In order to execute the decision, the courts, ex officio or at the
party's request, can adopt all the measures directed to its accom-
plishment. Yet the amparo judges in Venezuela do not have direct
power to punish by imposing criminal sanctions for disobedience of
their rulings. In other words, they do not have criminal contempt
power, which in contrast is one of the most important features of
the injunctive relief system in the United States. 216 These con-
Corocito, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PTBLICO, no 51, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas,
1992, pp. 171 ff.
213. See BREWER-CARAS, INSTITUCIONES POLfTICAS Y CONSTITUCIONALES, ToMO V, EL
DERECHO Y LA ACCI6N DE AMPARO, supra note 5, at 346.
214. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 36.
215. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 29-30.
216. This is particularly important regarding criminal contempt, which was established
since the In Re Debs case, where according to Justice Brewer who delivered the Court's
opinion, it was ruled:
But the power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to punish
for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience
has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the court. And this is no
technical rule. In order that a court may compel obedience to its order it must have
the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the
question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would op-
erate to deprive the proceedings of half its efficiency.
158 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895).
In Watson v. Williams, it was said:
The power to fine and imprison for contempt, from the earliest history of jurispru-
dence, has been regarded as the necessary incident and attribute of a court, without
which it could no more exist than without a judge. It is a power inherent in all courts
of record, and coexisting with them by the wise provisions of the common law. A court
without the power effectually to protect itself against the assaults of the lawless, or to
enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees against the recusant parties before it, would
be a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon the age which invented it.
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tempt powers are precisely what gave the injunction in the United
States its effectiveness regarding any disobedience, being the
same court empowered to vindicate its own power by imposing
criminal or economic sanctions by means of imprisonment and
fines. In Venezuela, in contrast, the amparo courts do not have
such powers, and regarding the application of criminal sanctions
to the disobedient party, the amparo courts or the interested party
must seek for the initiation of a judicial criminal procedure
against the disobedient to be brought before the competent crimi-
nal courts. 2
17
Due to the general by-instance procedural principle, the amparo
decisions can be appealed before the superior courts according to
the general rules established in the procedural codes. This gen-
eral principle, of course, does not apply when the decision is
adopted by the Supreme Tribunal. Consequently, the amparo de-
cisions can only be adopted by the Supreme Tribunal, when hav-
ing original jurisdiction, when deciding on appellate jurisdiction or
when an extraordinary mean for revision is filed, similar to the
writ for certiorari in the United States. In effect, particularly
when constitutional issues are involved, the United States Su-
preme Court, when considering a petition for a writ of certiorari, is
authorized to review all the decisions of the federal courts of ap-
peals, and of the specialized federal courts, and all the decisions of
the supreme courts of the states involving issues of federal law,
but on a discretionary basis. In all such cases where there is no
right of appeal and no mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court established, the cases can reach the Supreme Court
as petitions for certiorari, when a litigant who has lost in a lower
court and petitions a review in the Supreme Court, setting out the
reasons why review should be granted. 218 This method of seeking
review by the Supreme Court is expressly established in the cases
set forth in the Title 28 of the United States Code, and according
to Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court adopted in 2005,
where it is established as not being "a matter of right, but of judi-
cial discretion," granted only "for compelling reasons," that is,
when there are special and important reasons.21 9
36 Miss. 331, 341 (Hight Ct. of Errors & Appeals 1858). See also FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra
note 32, at 13; TABB & SHOBEN, supra note 53, at 72.
217. Venez. Amparo Law, Art. 31.
218. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 81 (1st ed. 1981).
219. SUP. CT. R. 10.
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According to this rule, to promote uniformity and consistency in
federal law, the following factors might prompt the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari: (1) Important questions of federal law
on which the court has not previously ruled; (2) Conflicting interpre-
tations of federal law by lower courts; (3) Lower courts' decisions
that conflict with previous Supreme Court decisions; and (4) Low-
er courts' departures from the accepted and usual course of judi-
cial proceedings. 22
0
Of course, review may be granted on the basis of other factors,
or denied even if one or more of the above-mentioned factors is
present. The discretion of the Supreme Court is not limited, and it
is the importance of the issue and the public interest considered
by the Court in a particular case that leads the Court to grant cer-
tiorari and to review some cases.
In countries with a mixed system of judicial review, as is the
case in Venezuela, the appellate jurisdiction of the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court as Constitutional Jurisdictions, in
order to review lower courts' decisions on constitutional matters,
is also established in a discretionary basis,221 and by means of an
extraordinary recourse for review, regarding lower courts deci-
sions applying the diffuse method and also the decisions issued on
amparo proceedings (Article 336,10).222
In this matter, in Venezuela, the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court, as Constitutional Jurisdiction, has developed ex
officio powers for reviewing lower courts' decisions on constitu-
tional matters, without any constitutional or statutory support.
Based on the aforementioned power of the Constitutional Cham-
ber to review in a discretionary way lower courts' decisions on con-
stitutional matters of importance, the Constitutional Chamber
distorting its constitutional review powers, has extended it to oth-
er decisions different from those issued on judicial review cases or
on amparo proceedings, as established in the constitution. 223
Through obligatory judicial doctrine, the Chamber extended its
review power regarding any other judicial decision issued in any
matters when it considers it contrary to the constitution, a power
that the Chamber considered authorized to exercise although
220. Id. See also RALPH. A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
CASES AND INTERPRETATION, 28 (1st ed. 1983).
221. This occurs in a similar way to the operation of the writ of certiorari in the United
States. See JESDS MARIA CASAL, CONSTITUCION Y JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL, 92 (1st ed.
2002).
222. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 336.10 (1999)..
223. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 336.10 (1999)..
Vol. 49234
Spring 2011 The Amparo Proceeding in Venezuela
without any constitutional provision, even ex officio. These review
powers have also been developed in cases of particular judicial
decisions when considered contrary to a Constitutional Chamber
interpretation of the constitution, or when considered a grievous
error regarding constitutional interpretation.
224
On the other hand, since 2004, the Organic Law of the Supreme
Tribunal, following such doctrine established by the same Tribu-
nal, gave general powers to all the Chambers of the Tribunal to
take away cases (avocamiento) from the jurisdiction of lower
courts, also ex officio or through a party petition, when considered
convenient, and to decide them.225 This power, which has been
highly criticized because it breaches due process rights, and par-
ticularly, the right to trial in a by-instance basis by the courts, has
allowed the Constitutional Chamber to intervene in any kind of
process, including cases being trialed by the other Chambers of
the Supreme Tribunal, with very negative effects. For instance,
the Constitutional Chamber power was used in order to annul a
decision issued by the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Tribu-
nal226 seeking to protect the citizens' right to political participa-
tion, in which the latter suspended the effects of a decision of the
National Electoral Council (Resolution n' 040302-131 of Mar. 2,
2004), objecting to the presidential repeal referendum petition of
2004. The Constitutional Chamber, in this way, by means of a
decision n° 566 of April 12, 2004, interrupted the process that was
normally developing before the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme
Tribunal, took away the case from such Chamber, and annulling
its decision, decided in a contrary sense, according to what was the
224. See Decision n' 93 of Feb. 6, 2001, Olimpia Tours and Travel vs. Corporacidn de
Turismo de Venezuela case, in REVISTA DE DERECHO P(BLICO, N* 85-88, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas, 2001, pp. 414-15. See also Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Quis Custodiet
ipsos Custodes: De la interpretaci6n constitucional a la inconstitucionalidad de la interpre-
tacidn, in VIII CONGRESO NACIONAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, PERO, SEPT. 2005,
Fondo Editorial, Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa, Arequipa, 2005, pp. 463-89.
225. See Article 25.16 of the Ley Orgdnica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, GACETA
OFICIAL No. 5991 Extra. of July 29, 2010. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Cr6nica de la
"IN"JUSTICIA CONSITuTIcIONAL. LA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL Y EL AUTORITARISMO EN
VENEZUELA, Editorial Juridica Venezolana 91 (2007).
226. See Decisions n 24 of Mar.15, 2004, (Exp. AA70-E 2004-000021; Exp. x-04-00006);
and n* 27 of Mar. 29, (Julio Borges, Csar Pgrez Vivas, Henry Ramos Allup, Jorge Sucre
Castillo, Ram6n Josd Medina y Gerardo Blyde vs. Consejo Nacional Electoral case (Exp.
AA70-E-2004-000021- AA70-V-2004-000006). See REVISTA DE DERECHO PEBLICO, n' 97-98,
Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2004, pp. 373 ff.
235
Duquesne Law Review




The two century tradition of Venezuelan constitutions of insert-
ing very extensive declarations on human rights, has proven that
in order for human rights to be effectively protected, independent-
ly of such formal declarations, the most important and necessary
tool is to have not only effective judicial remedies for the immedi-
ate protections of rights, but an independent and autonomous ju-
diciary.
Due to the traditional inefficacy of the ordinary and extraordi-
nary judicial remedies that in other countries have proven to be
effective for the protection of rights, in Venezuela, since 1961, the
constitution has incorporated an express provision regarding the
judicial guarantee of constitutional rights, establishing a specific
judicial remedy for its protection, called the amparo action or pro-
ceeding, having different procedural rules when compared with
the general judicial remedies that the legal system provides for
the protection of personal or property rights. As it has been ana-
lyzed, this constitutional feature is one of the most important of
Latin America constitutional law, particularly when contrasted
with the constitutional system of the United States or of the Unit-
ed Kingdom, where the protection of human rights is effectively
carried on through the general judicial actions and equitable rem-
edies, that are also used to protect any kind of personal or proper-
ty rights or interests.
This amparo remedy has been a very effective mean for the pro-
tection of constitutional rights, particularly in democratic regimes
where the Judiciary has been preserved as an independent branch
of government. Consequently, even providing in the constitution
for this specific remedy of amparo to assure the immediate protec-
tion of constitutional rights, the very essence of its effectiveness is
the existence of an independent and autonomous judiciary that
could effectively protect human rights. Unfortunately, in the Lat-
in American countries, the judiciary has not always accomplished
its fundamental duty, so that in spite of the constitutional declara-
227. See in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, LA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL VERSUS EL ESTADO
DEMOCRATICO DE DERECHO. EL SECUESTRO DEL PODER ELECTORAL Y DE LA SALA ELECTORAL
DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO Y LA CONFISCACI6N DEL DERECHO A LA PARTICIPACION POLITICA,
Los Libros de El Nacional, Colecci6n Ares, Caracas, 2004.
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tions and provisions for amparo, many countries have faced, and
others are still facing, a rather dismal situation regarding the ef-
fectiveness of the Judiciary as a whole, as an efficient and just
protector of fundamental rights.
That is why, in spite of the extensive constitutional declarations
of rights, in order to achieve the aims of the State of Justice, the
most elemental institutional condition needed in any country, is
the existence of a really autonomous and independent judiciary,
out of the reach and control from the other branches of govern-
ment, empowered to interpret and apply the law in an impartial
way and protect citizens, particularly when referring to the en-
forcement of rights against the state. Such judiciary has to be
built upon the principle of separation of powers. If this principle
is not implemented and the government controls the courts and
judges, no effective guarantee can exist regarding constitutional
rights, particularly when the offending party is a governmental
agency. In this case, and in spite of all constitutional declarations,
it is impossible to speak of rule of law, as happens in many Latin
American countries.
This is important, precisely on matters of amparo, particularly
when the petition is filed against a government or authoritative
act, in which case, no judicial protection can be given if the gov-
ernment controls the judiciary. Just one example can highlight
this situation. In a case developed in Venezuela in 2003, where as
a consequence of an amparo decision, the Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Action Jurisdiction (Jurisdicci6n contencioso-
administrativa) was intervened by the government, after being for
three decades a very important autonomous and independent ju-
risdiction in order to control the legality of Public Administration
activities.
In effect, in 2003 the Mayor of Caracas, the Ministry of Health
and the Caracas Metropolitan Board of Doctors (Colegio de Mddi-
cos) decided to hire Cuban doctors for an important popular gov-
ernmental health program in the Caracas slums, but without
complying with the legal conditions established for foreign doctors
to practice the medical profession in the country. Based on the
democratic tradition the country had since 1958 in matters of con-
trol and review of Public Administration actions, on July 17, 2003,
the Venezuelan National Federation of Doctors brought before the
aforementioned Judicial Review of Administrative Actions highest
Court in Caracas (First Court) a nullity claim against the afore-
mentioned decision The National Federation of Doctors considered
that the program was discriminatory and against the rights of
Duquesne Law Review
Venezuelan doctors to exercise their medical profession, allowing
foreign doctors to exercise it without complying with the Medical
Profession Statute regulations. The consequence was the filing of
an amparo petition against both public authorities, seeking the
collective protection of the Venezuelan doctors' constitutional
rights.22
8
One month later, in August 21, 2003, the First Court issued a
preliminary protective amparo measure, considering that there
were sufficient elements to deem that the equality before the law
constitutional guarantee was violated in the case. The Court or-
dered in a preliminary way the suspension of the Cuban doctors'
hiring program and ordered the Metropolitan Board of doctors to
substitute the Cuban doctors already hired, by Venezuelan ones or
foreign doctors who had fulfilled the legal regulations in order to
exercise the medical profession in the country.
229
Nonetheless, in response to that preliminary judicial amparo
decision, instead of enforcing it, the Minister of Health, the
Mayor of Caracas, and even the President of the Republic made
public statements to the effect that the decision was not going
to be respected or enforced. 230 Following these statements, the
government-controlled Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice adopted a decision, without any appeal be-
ing filed, assuming jurisdiction over the case and annulling the
preliminary amparo ordered by the First Court; a group of Se-
cret Service police officials seized the First Court's premises;
and the President of the Republic, among other expressions he
used, publicly called the President of the First Court a "ban-
dit."231 A few weeks later, in response to the First Court's de-
cision in an unrelated case challenging a local registrar's re-
fusal to record a land sale, a Special Commission for the Inter-
vention of the Judiciary, which in spite of being unconstitu-
228. See Claudia Nikken, El caso "Barrio Adentro" La Corte Primera de lo Contencioso
Administrativo ante la Sala Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia o el avoca-
miento como medio de amparo de derechos e intereses colectivos y difusos, REVISTA DE
DERECHO POBLICO, n 93-96, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2003, pp. 5 ff.
229. See Decision of Aug. 21, 2003; Id. at 445.
230. The President of the Republic said: "Vdyanse con su decisi6n no sd para don-
de, la cumplirdn ustedes en su casa si quieren . . . " CYou can go with your decision, I
don't know where; you will enforce it in your house if you want . . . "). See EL
UNIVERSAL, Caracas Aug. 25, 2003 and EL UNIVERSAL, Caracas Aug. 28, 2003.
231. See Apitz-Barbera et al. ("First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Ac-
tions") v. Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C No. 182, Aug. 5, 2008, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr. Excepci6n Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, Serie C, N*
182.
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tional continued to exist, dismissed all five judges of the First
Court.232 In spite of the protests of all the bar associations of
the country and also of the International Commission of Ju-
rists; 233 the First Court remained suspended without judges,
and its premises remained closed for about nine months, 234 a
period during which simply no judicial review of administrative
action could be sought in the country.
23 5
The dismissed judges of the First Court brought a complaint
to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights for the
government's unlawful removal of them and for violation of
their constitutional rights. The Commission, in turn, brought
the case, captioned Apitz Barbera et al. (Corte Primera de lo
Contencioso Administrativo vs. Venezuela) before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. On August 5, 2008, the In-
ter-American Court ruled that the Republic of Venezuela had
violated the rights of the dismissed judges established in the
American Convention of Human Rights, and ordered the state
to pay them due compensation, to reinstate them to a similar
position in the Judiciary, and to publish part of the decision in
Venezuelan newspapers. 236  Nonetheless, on December 12,
2008, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal
issued Decision No. 1.939, declaring that the August 5, 2008
decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was un-
enforceable (inejecutable) in Venezuela. The Constitutional
Chamber also accused the Inter-American Court of having
232. See EL NAcIONAL, Nov. 5, 2003, at A2. The dismissed President of the First
Court said: "La justicia venezolana vive un momento tenebroso, pues el tribunal
que constituye un diltimo resquicio de esperanza ha sido clausurado." ("The Vene-
zuelan judiciary lives a dark moment, because the court that was a last glimmer of
hope has been shut down."). Id. The Commission for the Intervention of the Judiciary
had also massively dismissed almost all judges of the country without due disciplinary
process, and had replaced them with provisionally appointed judges beholden to the
ruling power.
233. See in EL NACIONAL, Caracas Oct. 10, 2003, at A6; EL NACIONAL, Caracas Oct.
15, 2003, at A2; El Nacional, Caracas Sept. 24, 2003, at A4; EL NACIONAL, Caracas
Feb. 14, 2004, at A7.
234. See EL NACIONAL, Caracas Oct. 24, 2003, A2; and EL NACIONAL, Caracas July
16, 2004, at A6.
235. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La justicia sometida al poder (La ausencia de
independencia y autonomia de los jueces en Venezuela por la interminable emergencia
del Poder Judicial (1999-2006), in CUESTIONES INTERNACIONALES. Anuario Juridico
Villanueva, Madrid 2007, 25-57.
236. Apitz-Barbera et al. ("First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions')
v. Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C No. 182, Aug. 5, 2008, available at




usurped powers of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, and asked
the executive branch to denounce the American Convention of
Human Rights.
237
In general terms, this was the global governmental response to
an amparo judicial preliminary decision that affected a very sensi-
tive governmental social program; a response that was expressed
and executed through the government-controlled judiciary. 238 The
result was that the subsequent newly appointed judges replacing
those dismissed, began to "understand" how they needed to be-
have in the future. That same Commission for the Intervention of
the Judiciary, as mentioned, was the one that massively dismissed
without due disciplinary process almost all judges of the country,
substituting them with provisionally appointed judges, thus de-
pendent on the ruling power, who in 2006 were granted perma-
nent status without complying with the constitutional provi-
sions.23
9
This emblematic case, contrasted with the very progressive text
of the constitution in force in Venezuela (1999), which contains
one of the most extensive declaration of constitutional rights in all
Latin America, including the provision for the amparo action, even
considering it as a constitutional right; shows that the judicial
guarantee of constitutional rights always requires an independent
and autonomous judiciary, conducted out of the reach of the gov-
ernment. On the contrary, with a judiciary controlled by the ex-
ecutive, as the aforementioned Venezuelan case illustrates, the
237. Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Constitutional Chamber, Decision n° 1.939 of Dec.
18, 2008, Abogados Gustavo Alvarez Arias et al. case, (Exp. No. 08-1572), in REVISTA
DE DERECHO POBLICO, n° 116, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2008, pp. 89-96.
238. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La progresiva y sistemdtica demolici6n institucional de
la autonomia e independencia del Poder Judicial en Venezuela 1999-2004, XXX JORNADAS
J.M DOMANGUEZ EscovAR, ESTADO DE DERECHO, ADMINISTRACI6N DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS
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declaration of constitutional rights is a death letter, and the provi-
sion of the action for amparo is no more than an illusion. This has
been the tragic institutional result of the deliberated process of
dismantling democracy to which Venezuela has been subjected
during the past decade, through the imposition of an authoritarian
government, defrauding the constitution and democracy itself.
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